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Abstract 
This paper discusses the pricing- and welfare implications of mergers in two-sided media 
markets. Media firms typically rely on revenues from two very different, but inextricably 
linked, customer groups: consumers and advertisers. As a result, the pricing decisions of 
media firms are more complex than those of firms operating in regular single-sided industries. 
We develop two theoretical models in order to investigate the effects of a merger between 
competing duopolists. In the first model, the only way for media firms to stimulate demand is 
by lowering content prices, whereas firms in the second model also can attract consumers by 
increasing the inherent quality of their product. As we abstract from the existence of 
efficiency gains, the merger should, in accordance with classic merger theory, inevitably be 
detrimental to prices and welfare. We find that content prices could decrease while welfare 
could increase as a result of a merger. Moreover, the merger could be welfare enhancing, even 
with higher content prices, if consumers are sufficiently compensated by virtue of higher 
quality products.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Few industries impact as many people’s lives on a daily basis as the ever-evolving chaos that 
is the media industry. While media markets for many years were confined mainly to the 
printed media and radio- and television broadcasts, a wave of tremendously innovative and 
user-friendly media forms have emerged over the last decade, captivating a worldwide 
audience on their way. The media industry is undergoing profound changes, on a scale never 
seen before, and the traditional media are finding their market shares threatened – both 
amongst audiences and advertisers. As a result, many media firms have identified the need to 
consolidate their operations and take advantage of the benefits that come with being a larger 
player in today’s increasingly competitive market place. 
These trends are global. Even in the small country of Norway, we have witnessed a series of 
large mergers in recent years, involving some of the biggest, most powerful media firms in the 
region. In 2006, Orkla Media – at the time controlling a portfolio of 31 local newspapers – 
was acquired by the international media giant Mecom. Two years later, in 2008, four of 
Norway’s largest regional newspapers – Aftenposten, Bergens Tidende, Stavanger Aftenblad 
and Fædrelandsvennen – joined forces to form Media Norge. Moreover, only since the turn of 
2011, we have seen Media Norge integrated into Schibsted, and in the most recent of events, 
on the 26
th
 of May 2011, news surfaced that A-Pressen and Dagbladet were holding talks to 
discuss the possibility of merging the two entities. 
With this backdrop in mind, we pose the question of how such mergers affect the strategic 
incentives of media firms with regard to their choice of product prices and advertising space. 
Moreover, how does the combining of media firms – merging to form more powerful entities– 
affect overall welfare for society? These questions are warranted because, as we aim to 
demonstrate in this paper, conventional anti-trust rationale might not apply. To arrive at this 
realization, we need to understand the special characteristics that constitute media markets. 
In the last few years, a string of interesting papers have given clear indications that media 
markets are indeed governed by mechanisms which can sometimes give rise to surprising – 
even unprecedented – results. For instance, in a paper on the effects of imposing an added-
value tax on newspapers
1
, Kind, Schjelderup and Stähler (2009) find that prices could 
                                                          
1
 Many western countries today provide tax-exemptions for newspapers in order to soften competition and 
preserve plurality of opinions. In Norway, for instance, newspapers are completely exempted from the added-
value tax. 
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decrease while journalistic quality could increase as a consequence of such a regulation. 
These are quite staggering results by the face of it, completely at odds with popular belief and 
common economic intuition. Such findings suggest that media markets are truly unique, 
meriting thorough examination. Furthermore, it underlines how important it is for those 
charged with supervising these markets to be aware that they function in ways not easily 
reconcilable with economic theory. A failure to do so could lead to policies which end up 
decreasing consumer – and indeed overall – welfare. 
What is it then, that makes media markets special? In short, it is because they are two-sided. 
While most markets would appear to have two sides, namely buyers and sellers, the term 
“two-sided market” refers to a specific type of market. Media firms are typical examples as 
they compete for business on two sides: they require a base of media users to use their 
product, the attention of which they can sell on to advertisers. This means that there are 
network externalities between the two sides which could influence the strategic decisions of 
media firms, leading them to act very differently than firms operating in traditional single-
sided industries. 
In light of the special features of media markets, we are somewhat puzzled to find that little or 
no work has been done on mergers specifically related to such markets. This is particularly 
surprising considering recent trends, with mergers and acquisitions commonplace in today’s 
media industry. Our work therefore contributes to the literature on both mergers and two-
sided markets in a number of ways. 
First, we build a comprehensive model of media markets, accounting explicitly for their two-
sided nature, enabling us to investigate how mergers affect the pricing policies of media firms 
in two-sided markets. We find that a monopolist could indeed find it optimal to set lower 
content prices than competing duopolists. This result is very much contrary to popular opinion 
and at odds with traditional anti-trust rationale. The intuition is that the merged media firm 
can leverage its increased market power to extract a higher margin from advertisers. Because 
the monopolist can make higher profits from the sale of ads, his incentives to underprice 
content in order to boost demand increases. 
Secondly, we extend the analysis to accommodate endogenous quality investments. This 
allows us to investigate how media firms’ incentives to invest in quality are affected by a 
merger. We find that quality investments could indeed be higher if the competing duopolists 
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merge to form a monopoly. As far as we know, we are the first to study how a merger in a 
two-sided market affects incentives to invest in quality.  
Our third, and main contribution, is that we are able to demonstrate how a merger can be 
welfare enhancing – even in the absence of efficiency gains – for consumers and society as a 
whole if the market is two-sided. Moreover, our results show that welfare can increase, even 
with higher prices on the consumer side, if consumers are sufficiently compensated through 
higher product quality. We believe these to be important results as welfare gains arise 
specifically due to the two-sided nature of media markets. To our knowledge, we are the first 
to explicitly analyze potential welfare gains of mergers in two-sided media markets. We 
therefore see this paper as an important contribution both to the long line of work related to 
mergers, and to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets. 
Before moving on to the technicalities of our modeling approach, we provide a survey of the 
existing literature on two-sided markets, mergers, and – specifically – on mergers in two sided 
markets. At the very outset, however, we find it feasible to define some key concepts which 
will be central throughout this paper. 
1.1 Two-sided markets 
The theory on two-sided markets first emerged around the beginning of the new millennium 
with the pioneering work often accredited to Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Caillaud and 
Jullien (2001, 2003). While the theory was first developed in relation to payment cards, it was 
quickly extended to a number of other markets such as those for newspapers, video games, 
computer operating systems – even dating clubs! 
Although one might initially struggle to see the similarities between an operating system and 
a dating club, they are in fact characterized by the same properties in that the platform – in 
this particular example, the operating system or the dating club – must get both sides “on 
board” for there to even be a market. Both sides, in this case, refer to users and software 
developers for the operating system, and men and women for the dating club. An operating 
system relies on the development of software programs in order to get users, and, conversely, 
there need to be users for the operating system to attract software developers. Likewise, a 
dating club needs female customers in order to attract male customers, and vice versa. For 
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platforms in such markets then, clearly, a “chicken-and-egg problem”2 exists, with the 
solution crucially relying on the design of a viable pricing strategy. 
The two above-mentioned examples should give a good understanding of what constitutes a 
two-sided market, but in spite of this, scholars have yet to agree on a common definition. 
Several suggestions have been proposed, but we find a definition from Anderson and Coate 
(2005) to be particularly attractive: 
“A two-sided market is one where the participants on at least one side care directly about the 
number of participants on the other […] where the two sides are intermediated by a platform, 
or platforms, which typically competes for business from both sides” 
Although simple, this sentence perfectly epitomizes the unique nature of two-sided markets. 
These markets are characterized by two distinct groups of customers which may respond 
differently to changes in the level of consumption on the other side, where a platform is 
needed to facilitate the transaction between the two groups. As noted by Kind, Nilssen and 
Sørgård (2009), this is unlike the standard theory of complementary goods in consumption 
where there, conversely, are not two distinct groups of consumers. 
1.2 Mergers 
Put simply, a merger occurs when two companies become one. The term “merger” however, 
encompasses numerous types of arrangements that differ by the relationship between the 
targeted and the acquiring firm, and by the method of compensation involved in the 
transaction
3
. If the acquiring firm is buying or selling to the targeted firm, it is classified as a 
vertical merger, whereas a merger between companies in unrelated industries is called a 
conglomerate merger. This paper however, deals exclusively with a third kind of merger, that 
of a horizontal nature, which we define as: 
“An economic arrangement between two or more companies performing similar functions in 
the production or sales of comparable products or services, i.e. competitors, involving the 
combining of the business entities into one, where the result is the elimination of whatever 
competition existed between the companies prior to the consolidation” 
                                                          
2
 Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Julien (2003) were the first to use the analogy of the chicken and the egg to 
illustrate the problem faced by two-sided platforms. 
3
 The latter relates to whether shareholders of the targeted firm receive stock or cash as payment for target 
shares, a distinction irrelevant to this paper. 
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Although the great majority of mergers are legal
4
, mergers involving firms of a certain size 
could be subject to investigation and litigation by competition authorities if deemed 
potentially detrimental to prices – either directly, as a result of eliminated competition 
between the merging parties, or indirectly by inducing coordination in the industry. This paper 
is only concerned with the former – the pure market power effect of mergers – and does not 
address matters of tacit collusion. We will nevertheless provide a brief discussion also of the 
latter in the next section as we survey the classic literature on mergers. Here, we will also 
discuss the role of efficiency gains, although we abstract from the presence of such effects in 
our model. 
1.3 Economic welfare 
At the very center of this paper is the question of how mergers in two-sided markets impact 
economic welfare. Economic welfare is a measure of how an industry performs, aggregating 
the welfare of all consumers and producers in the economy. In our case, this refers to media 
firms, advertisers and users of media products (consumers). The welfare (or surplus) of an 
individual consumer is given by the difference between his or her valuation of a good and the 
price he or she must pay to purchase it. The welfare of a producer is equal to the profit he 
makes from selling the good. The total consumer surplus can therefore be found by adding up 
the surpluses of all consumers, while total producer surplus is given by summarizing the 
profits of all producers in the industry. 
An ongoing debate relates to whether equal weight should be given to the consumer- and the 
producer surplus, and what should be the ultimate objective of anti-trust authorities – to 
maximize consumer welfare or total welfare. While most of the scholarly literature argues that 
the welfare of consumers and producers should be given equal weight, the wording of anti-
trust legislation in both the EU and in the US seem to indicate that authorities are indeed 
leaning towards a consumer objective (Motta, 2004)
5
. 
One argument in favor of the latter view is that authorities could have an important role in 
rebalancing the relative lobbying positions of consumers and producers. Because consumers 
                                                          
4
 Motta (2004) reports that of 1500 reported merger cases between 1990 and 2000, only 13 were blocked by the 
European Commission. 
5
 For instance, regarding efficiency gains: “the Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would 
be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price 
increases in that market” (US Merger Guidelines, 2010:30) 
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usually are much more dispersed than producers, they are less able to oppose, say, an 
unwanted regulation which causes prices to rise. Producers, by coordinating their efforts, 
could be in a strong position to lobby in favor of the regulation, while a diverse mass of 
consumers will find it difficult to speak with one voice. A second argument is that, because of 
information asymmetries between producers and authorities, especially in the case of 
evaluating efficiency gains from mergers, more weight should be given to consumer welfare 
in order to counter-balance any potential biases due to the superior information of producers. 
A third, and slightly more prosaic, argument argues that a sole focus on consumer welfare is 
feasible as it greatly simplifies the task of anti-trust authorities as they can limit themselves to 
studying the effects on prices and avoid the difficult task of evaluating effects on profits 
(Motta, 2004). 
A number of compelling arguments can be made against anti-trust authorities taking such a 
view however. For one thing, by definition, gains to producers will not be accounted for, 
which might ultimately hurt consumers as the many consumers that hold stocks in companies, 
either directly or through pension- or investment funds, would suffer from lower profits. 
Another important argument is that a sole focus on consumer welfare would be unreasonably 
harsh on producers, eventually leading to products being priced at marginal cost and thereby 
depriving companies of any prospect of innovation and investments in new products and 
technologies. In this paper, we follow the consensus in the literature by ascribing equal weight 
to the surpluses of consumers and producers, meaning we consider the effects of mergers on 
total welfare. 
There is also another debate, concerning media markets specifically, pertaining to whether the 
welfare of advertisers should be included in total welfare or if advertisers’ profit should be 
regarded a mere transfer from the users of the media product. The crux of the matter is 
whether ads should be considered informative or persuasive towards consumers. We follow 
Anderson and Coate (2005) and Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005) in assuming that ads 
provide consumers with valuable information about the characteristics of new products. This 
implies that advertiser welfare is treated as part of total welfare. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a thorough review of 
the relevant literature in order to place our work in the larger context. Section 3 is devoted to 
the first of our two models, where quality is given exogenously. We start by outlining the 
characteristics of all market participants, before solving and comparing equilibrium outcomes 
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for duopoly and monopoly, respectively. We then calculate welfare under each scenario, 
before finally comparing them to outline the conditions under which a merger can be welfare 
enhancing. Section 4 continues in the same vein as the preceding section, but our framework 
is here extended to also accommodate endogenous quality investments. Section 5 discusses 
the possible limitations of our model and points to future research directions, section 6 relates 
our findings to empirical work, before we finally summarize and draw our conclusions in 
section 7. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While mergers have interested economists for centuries, resulting in a comprehensive 
literature integral to the daily workings of anti-trust agencies all over the world, little or no 
attention was given to two-sided markets before the new millennia. Notwithstanding its brief 
history however, interest in two-sided markets has been mounting over the last few years, 
inducing an influential and rapidly evolving branch of economic literature. Although there is 
now a relatively large body of work available on two-sided markets, we are somewhat 
surprised to find that very little of the existing research deals with mergers specifically. 
In this review, we start out by surveying the seminal literature on two-sided markets, where 
we give special attention to media markets – a unique species of two-sided markets – as this is 
the most relevant to our analysis. We then proceed to survey the classic literature on mergers, 
before finally investigating to which extent the existing literature has addressed the 
implications of two-sidedness for anti-trust analysis in general, and mergers in particular. 
2.1 Two-sided markets 
As the last in a number of survey articles, Rochet and Tirole (2006) summarized what had 
been done in the mere four years since the first paper explicitly referring to “two-sided 
markets” was published in 2002. Rochet and Tirole conceptualized their ideas on two-sided 
markets with a paper on the determination of interchange fees in payment card associations, 
but it soon became clear that their results applied more widely and that the same framework 
could be used to describe a variety of interesting markets. Much of the literature which 
emerged after Rochet and Tirole (2002) however, was focused on media markets. 
Media markets are two-sided because platforms – newspapers, television- or radio channels – 
match advertisers to audiences by selling their content to users and access to those users to 
advertisers. What sets media markets apart from most other two-sided markets is that while 
network externalities between the two customer groups usually are positive for most two-
sided markets – as in the opening case of the dating club and the operating system – this is not 
necessarily the case for media markets. While advertisers certainly want as many consumers 
as possible to use the platform, so that they can reach a bigger audience with their ads, 
consumers tend not to show the same regard for the advertisers. Whether advertisers exert a 
positive or negative effect on consumers is an empirical question which has been found to 
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differ between different media industries
6
. The consensus opinion seems to be that the 
direction of the externality is ambiguous, maybe positive, in the case of newspaper readers, 
while it is most likely negative for television viewers (Anderson & Coate, 2005). We will 
revisit this issue later when we discuss the setup of our model. Media markets had long been 
the subject of considerable research, but early work overlooked problems related to pricing 
structure and so failed to explain how platforms design their pricing strategy so as to 
accommodate both sides of the market
7
. Rochet and Tirole (2002) provided the building 
blocks for a more realistic description of media markets and paved the way for a string of 
influential publications in this area. 
The pricing structure prevailing in a two-sided market will often differ quite significantly 
from that observed in a single-sided market. It is for instance not uncommon for a platform in 
a two-sided market to sell a product with a considerable discount on one side in order to earn 
a margin on the other. This is particularly evident in many media markets where the content 
side tends to be heavily subsidized while the platform raises most of its revenue from 
advertisers
8
. The by now well-established explanation for such a skewed pricing structure is 
the presence of network externalities between the two sides of the market, which the 
platforms must take into account when making their pricing decisions on either side
9
. Rochet 
and Tirole (2006) note that also the presence of marquee buyers and captive customers, as 
well as the extent to which customers are multi-homing, meaning they use several platforms, 
could influence the price structure. Marquee buyers on one side, which participants on the 
other side consider to be extremely valuable, can allow the platform to raise prices on the 
selling side, and, similarly, higher prices could be charged to captive customers that for 
whatever reason are considered unlikely to leave the platform, for instance because they 
would incur non-negligible switching costs. 
In the scholarly literature on media markets, one of three frameworks is usually deployed: the 
Hotelling model, the Salop model or the model of the representative consumer. These three 
frameworks have different features and therefore suit different purposes. In order to facilitate 
the upcoming discussion, we provide a short description of each of them. 
                                                          
6
 For a few recent empirical studies of the nuisance effect, we refer to Kaizer and Wright (2006) and Kaiser and 
Song (2009) who find a positive impact of advertising on readership demand for magazines in Germany. 
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) and Fan (2010) find demand for newspapers in Italy to be unaffected by 
advertising. 
7
 See for instance Katz (1985, 1986) and Tirole (1988). 
8
 Godes et al (2009) refer to this as the “underpricing effect”. 
9
 This is well documented in the series of seminal articles by Rochet and Tirole and Caillaud and Jullien (2003). 
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The Hotelling framework – named after its architect Harold Hotelling – has been used 
extensively in the literature ever since first publicized in 1929. The standard model allows for 
a study of a duopoly situation where two firms choose their location on a horizontal line. The 
framework could be adapted to accommodate multiple firms. The line can be interpreted 
either as a geographical line, for instance showing the physical location of two firms in a city, 
or in an intangible manner as illustrating two newspapers’ affiliations in the political 
spectrum
10
. Consumers of the two goods are uniformly distributed along the line and incur 
transport costs when “travelling” to consume a product. Travelling could be literally travelling 
through the city to get to the store, or travelling in the sense that the consumer must 
sometimes consume a product that is not identical to his or her preferences
11
. The standard 
Hotelling framework assumes that consumers on both sides are single-homing, meaning that 
they are using one – and only one – platform, and that the market is covered, implying that 
demand is perfectly inelastic. The latter assumption is tantamount to the standard Hotelling 
framework being unsuitable for the type of analysis we are doing in this paper as demand 
would be unaffected by a merger. It should be noted however that it is possible to circumvent 
this problem by using some modified version of the Hotelling framework. One such example 
can be found in Leonello (2010) – a paper we will revisit later in this section. 
The Salop framework, unlike Hotelling, does not allow for endogenous differentiation by 
media firms as they are evenly distributed around a “circular city”. The features of the Salop 
model however make it the ideal tool for a study of entry and the optimal number of firms in 
an industry. For obvious reasons this cannot be addressed in a Hotelling framework as the 
number of firms are fixed. A couple of interesting applications of the Salop framework can be 
found in Choi (2006) and Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2009). 
The third framework – which will form the basis for the model we build in this paper – is that 
of the representative consumer. Here the demand of one individual is scaled up so as to derive 
the total market demand for the platform. We follow Kind et al. (2009a) and Godes et al. 
(2009) in normalizing the population size to one, meaning we can interpret the consumption 
of a media product such as a television channel as the amount of time the consumer spends 
watching the particular television channel, or as the number of viewers of the given television 
channel. One important limitation of this model is highlighted in Godes et al. (2009); when 
                                                          
10
  One interesting application of the Hotelling framework can be found in Kind, Schjelderup and Stähler (2009). 
11
 For a detailed discussion on the Hotelling framework,we refer to Hotelling (1929) and d’Aspremont, C., 
Gabszewicz, J.J, Jaskold, J. and J.F. Thisse (1979). 
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assuming that all consumers have the exact same preferences we admittedly overlook 
heterogeneity amongst users of the media product. This could be important because 
advertisers often are interested in targeting specific groups of customers. In response to this 
critique, however, the authors argue that it makes sense if one sees the analysis as taking place 
at the segment level rather than the aggregated market level. Although this framework is now 
used extensively in the literature, it is nevertheless important to be aware of this limitation. 
Godes et al. (2009) argue that the literature on media markets can be roughly separated into 
two groups depending on whether media firms are assumed to be able to charge a price for 
their content or not. The latter was a widespread assumption in most early work on 
broadcasting markets which typically dealt with how media firms choose to differentiate their 
content, how they decide on the level of advertising on the platform, and whether advertising 
is over- or underprovided in the competitive equilibrium compared to in the social optimum. 
As pointed out by Godes et al. (2009) however, these models did not account for the impact of 
competition on the marginal profit in each market, and so failed to address how companies 
might decide to lower the price on one side in order to make a margin on the other. The other 
branch of the literature then, is that which assumes that media firms can charge their users for 
access to content, as well as charge advertisers for access to those users. 
Peitz and Valetti (2008) is an interesting article in this respect, as they analyze how 
differences in media platforms’ ability to charge their viewers affect advertising intensity and 
program content. Two differing scenarios are compared: the first being a “free-to-air” regime 
where media platforms are unable to charge their viewers and so must rely solely on income 
from advertisers, whereas in the opposite case of a “pay-tv” regime, media platforms are also 
able to charge their viewers – meaning they have two sources of revenue. The principle 
objective of the paper is to investigate which of these market structures gives rise to the 
market equilibrium closer to the social optimum; the authors are in other words performing a 
welfare analysis.  
A model is constructed using the standard Hotelling framework, and as customary in the 
literature when addressing the television market, a parameter measuring the nuisance felt by 
consumers when encountering ads is included. Higher values of this parameter translate into 
strong distaste for ads, while lower values imply that viewers are somewhat indifferent with 
regard to the amount of advertising on the television channel. Viewers are modeled as single-
homing, meaning they watch one, and only one, television channel – an assumption not easily 
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reconcilable with what we observe in real-life as most viewers presumably tune in to more 
than one channel
12
. The authors circumvent this problem by stating that they are considering 
competition for a given time-slot rather than competition between two television channels. 
Advertisers, on the other hand, have the option of advertising on none, one, or both platforms. 
Informative advertising is assumed, implying that ads carry valuable information to 
consumers about product characteristics of new products. 
By not restricting prices to be positive – implying that platforms can subsidize viewers – Peitz 
and Valetti (2008) obtain the somewhat special result that equilibrium profit under a “pay-tv” 
regime is independent of the size of the advertising market
13
. In their model, the increased 
revenues from advertising will be exactly offset by the lost income due to lower content 
prices. The authors show that the standard Hotelling result of maximum differentiation then 
emerges where platforms always choose to differentiate their content to the extreme. This 
result is independent of the nuisance parameter and the size of the advertising market. 
Platforms under “pay-tv” set the level of advertising which equates the marginal revenue per 
viewer to the marginal cost of advertising – where the latter is given by the nuisance 
parameter. This means that for very high levels of the nuisance parameter, platforms will shut 
down the advertising market entirely as the disutility of viewers will exceed any profit which 
could be made from advertising. As long as platforms find it profitable to operate a market for 
advertising however – implying that the nuisance effect is not too high – there is an under-
provision of advertising under “pay-tv”. This is because platforms do not account for the 
surplus of advertisers when setting their ad levels. 
In the opposite case of “free-to-air” we would expect platforms to provide more advertising as 
they are not able to raise revenues from consumer payments. However, by relying solely on 
advertising income, the only way for platforms to make themselves more attractive to viewers 
is to decrease the amount of advertising. Peitz and Valetti (2008) show that while content will 
always be differentiated to the extreme under a “pay-tv” regime, differentiation under “free-
to-air” depends positively on the nuisance parameter so that maximal differentiation only 
occurs for very high levels of nuisance. Differentiation also depends negatively on transport 
cost. In general, they find differentiation to be less pronounced under a “free-to-air” regime. 
The level of advertising decreases with the size of the nuisance parameter, but is also affected 
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 Single-homing is more representative of the newspaper market where readers in many cases subscribe 
exclusively to one newspaper. 
13
 While this assumption appears to be somewhat ad-hoc, the authors maintain that imposing prices to be positive 
will not impact their welfare results in a meaningful way. 
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by the size of transport costs and the extent to which platforms are differentiated. If viewers 
are indifferent toward ads, platforms will – as under “pay-tv” – provide the monopoly level of 
advertising. As long as viewers are somewhat disliking ads, however, the ad level will be 
strictly lower than the monopoly level. A move towards a more central location on the 
Hotelling line or lower transport costs similarly puts downward pressure on the ad level. The 
result of profit neutrality does not persist under “free-to-air”, as profits decline with the level 
of the nuisance parameter. 
When comparing the welfare properties of the two payment regimes, Peitz and Valetti (2008) 
find – perhaps not surprisingly – that neither “free-to-air” nor “pay-tv” end up producing an 
equilibrium equal to the social optimum. The key finding from the paper is that too little 
advertising is provided and content is too differentiated compared to the social optimum under 
a “pay-tv” regime, whereas results for “free-to-air” are ambiguous as they depend on the size 
of transport costs and the extent to which viewers find ads to be a nuisance. Ergo, which of 
the two payment regimes is better from a welfare perspective is ultimately also dependent on 
the size of these two parameters. In general, Peitz and Valetti (2008) conclude that a move 
from “free-to-air” to “pay-tv” will be welfare enhancing if competition in the market in 
question is sufficiently intense and the nuisance parameter is not too high. 
This article by Peitz and Valetti (2008) illustrates well how welfare assessments in media 
markets are complicated by the competitive pressure in the media market in question and, in 
particular, media users’ attitudes towards advertising. In a related exercise, Anderson and 
Coate (2005) investigate the nature of market failures in the television market by analyzing 
whether platforms offer the socially desirable number of channels and to which extent they 
offer advertising compared to social optimum. Like Peitz and Valetti (2008), they find that the 
level of advertising offered under a “pay-tv” regime will be below the social optimal level, 
but in addition they conclude that the subjective cost for viewers will be higher in the case of 
“pay-tv” than in the case where television channels raise all their revenue from advertising. 
Again, as in the analysis of Peitz and Valetti (2008), a crucial role is played by the nuisance 
parameter. There are, however, even more factors that can complicate such studies of media 
markets. One particularly important consideration is how media firms’ incentives to invest in 
quality might differ under the different payment regimes.  
In fact, once we account for the fact that media firms can invest in quality in order to attract 
viewers, the latter result from Anderson and Coate (2005) might not hold. Too see this, think 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
20 
 
of what happens if quality investments are higher under “pay-tv”. A higher inherent quality of 
the product is generally thought to increase a consumers’ utility from consuming the product, 
and a media firm could thereby increase demand by increasing quality investments. 
Moreover, if firms have stronger incentives to invest in quality under “pay-tv”, the increased 
utility consumers get from watching higher quality channels could outweigh the adverse price 
effect. When accounting for quality investments then, the result from Anderson and Coate 
(2005) that the subjective cost is higher under “pay-tv” might not persist. One of the main 
contributions of our paper is that we investigate whether such incentives to invest in quality 
changes as a result of a merger. 
The two aforementioned articles were built on the Hotelling framework, where the number of 
firms was fixed to two. In reality however, media firms will often have many competitors 
which compete for both users and advertisers. Intuitively, we would expect also the number of 
competitors and the extent to which products are substitutable for one another to have 
considerable impacts on the strategic decisions of media firms. These matters are also likely 
to be of great importance to our analysis as we examine the welfare implications of a media 
merger.  
Kind et al. (2009a) provide key insights in this context as they investigate how competitive 
pressures in an industry impact media firms’ choice of whether to raise revenue from 
advertisers or users. Their analysis can be considered somewhat complementary to Godes et 
al. (2009) which we will discuss in detail later when we turn to the literature on mergers in 
two-sided markets. Both articles build models in the mold of the representative consumer. The 
key trait of Kind et al. (2009a) is that they make an explicit distinction between increased 
competitive pressures due to (1) higher content substitutability and (2) there being more 
media firms in the industry. To the contrary, Godes et al. (2009) have only one parameter for 
competitive pressure, and are as such unable to separate the effects of increased content 
substitutability and increased number of media firms as sources of intensified competition. 
Kind et al. (2009), however, argues that this distinction is paramount, as the two sources of 
competition have very different implications for how media firms raise revenues. 
Kind et al. (2009a) show that if competitive pressure rises by virtue of higher content 
substitutability, advertising levels and –profits will increase, while content profits decline. If, 
on the other hand, competition increases because of there being more media firms in the 
industry, both advertising- and content revenues will decline. The intuition is that media firms 
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will find it hard to charge consumers for access to a content which is not significantly 
different from its competitors, and they will so choose to bundle more ads the more similar 
the content. This is why, for instance, many internet sites offering similar content, in most 
cases must rely solely on revenues from advertising. Kind et al. (2009a) also show that when 
moving from a monopoly to a duopoly, the advertising market becomes more important, 
while any move towards more media firms will lead to higher importance of content 
payments. This is because, as the number of media firms approach infinity, they will have no 
market power in advertising targeted at their own consumers. They do, however, still have 
some market power in the sale of content to consumers if it is somewhat differentiated. 
There are two key findings from Kind et al. (2009a). First, a media firm’s ability to raise 
revenue from users will depend on whether close content substitutes are offered by rivaling 
firms. The less differentiated the content, the less revenue the media firm will be able to raise 
from user payment, and so the platform becomes more reliant on income from advertising. 
Secondly, advertising revenues, on the other hand, are dependent on how many rival firms 
there are competing for the same advertisers. Kind et al. (2009a) concludes that, in light of 
these results, we should expect to see increased importance of user payments the more 
competing media firms there are in the industry. Kind et al. (2009a) is an important 
contribution to the literature as they show how the revenue strategies of media firms are 
dictated by the competitive environment.  
2.2 Mergers in single-sided markets 
A comprehensive body of research exists on mergers, and their potential detrimental 
implications for competition and welfare are well-established. As a result, most developed 
countries today have adopted some form of anti-trust legislation calling for competition 
authorities to canvass mergers. In the US, the central anti-trust provisions are found in the 
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These provisions are 
enforced by the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) together with the Anti-trust Division of the 
Justice Department. The techniques, practices, and rules by which they evaluate potential 
merger effects are outlined in the Merger Guidelines – the latest edition of which were 
released in 2010. The overriding objective of competition policy with regard to mergers is to 
prevent any merger that might “create, reinforce or entrench market power” (US Merger 
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Guidelines, 2010:2). The key statutory provision can be found in section 7 of the Clayton Act 
of 1914 which states that a merger is to be prohibited if:  
“[…] in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the 
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly”14 
While there are many ways in which a merger could lead to reduced competition, the 
literature generally distinguishes between mergers with unilateral and coordinated effects 
(Motta, 2004). The former refers to mergers which by simply eliminating competition 
between the merging parties allows the merged firm to unilaterally exercise market power, 
whereas mergers of the latter kind reduce competition by facilitating collusion in the industry. 
Motta (2004) notes that whether a merger might lead to a collusive outcome or not in practice 
will depend on a number of factors, such as the presence of structural linkages between firms, 
frequency of market interactions and information exchange amongst firms. As noted, 
however, such effects are not the focus of this paper and as such will be abstracted from in the 
following. 
In this paper we develop a model which allows us to examine the pricing- and welfare effects 
of a merger between two firms competing in a duopoly fashion. This means that the merger 
results in a monopoly and the corresponding unilateral effects are therefore particularly strong 
as the merger eliminates all competition, allowing the merged firm to charge monopoly 
prices. The scenario where two firms merge to form a monopoly, however, is admittedly a 
special one. In the more typical scenario where there are several independent firms left in the 
industry post-merger, unilateral effects will be less pronounced but could still have a 
significant impact on competition. Unilateral effects are typically manifested in higher prices 
or reduced output, but can also be utilized in ways that hurt consumers by virtue of reduced 
product quality, reduced product variety or diminished investments in research and 
development. The extent to which the increased market power can be leveraged is dependent 
on constraining factors on both the demand- and supply side (Motta, 2004). Such constraining 
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 Although phrased in a slightly different manner, these sentiments are echoed by anti-trust legislation in the 
EU. The EC Merger Regulation Act of 2004 (Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings) states that: “it should be ensured that the process of 
reorganization does not result in lasting damage to competition; Community law must therefore include 
provisions governing those concentrations which may significantly impede effective competition in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it”. For an in-depth comparison of the two merger policies, we refer to 
Bergman, Coate, Jakobsson and Ulrick (2006). 
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factors on the supply side are small market shares of the merging firms, high threat from 
potential new entrants and excess capacity amongst rival firms. Factors on the demand side 
relate to whether demand is elastic or whether the firm is dealing with concentrated buyers 
possessing bargaining power. 
As a general rule however, in the absence of efficiency gains, mergers with unilaterally 
effects reduce consumer surplus and total welfare (Motta, 2004). Moreover, profits will 
increase not only for the merged firms, but also for the other firms operating in the same 
industry. The reason why also competitors benefit from a merger is that they can “free-ride” 
by following the merged firms in charging higher prices, thereby earning higher profits 
(Motta, 2004). It should be noted that this latter result might not persist if firms are assumed 
to set quantities rather than prices. If it indeed is the case that firms compete in quantities as 
opposed to prices, competitors will respond to a reduced quantum – entailing a price increase– 
by the merged firm, with an increase of their own production, resulting in lower prices on 
their products. Motta (2004) notes that although this might even result in the merged firm 
losing from the merger, the overall effect of the merger will still be detrimental to consumer 
surplus
15
. 
While the pure market power effect of mergers will be harmful to competition and welfare, 
efficiency gains could mitigate their potential harmful effects. As Williamson (1968) was the 
first to point out, efficiency gains could indeed neutralize – and even outweigh – the adverse 
effects of a merger
16
. In fact, with efficiency gains of sufficient size, a merger could allow the 
merging parties to rationalize their activities, making it profitable for the merged firm to lower 
its prices. Although competing producers will suffer from tougher competition, welfare and 
consumer surplus will increase with sufficiently large efficiency gains (Motta, 2004). The 
most common source of efficiency gains are economies of scale and of scope. Economies of 
scale arise because of falling average cost of production as the scale of output is increased. By 
rationalizing and reorganizing production, the merged firms can reduce their cost of 
production. Efficiency gains could also present themselves through economics of scope which 
involves the bundling of marketing and sales or synergies in research and development.  
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 For models with Bertrand- and Cournot competition, respectively, we refer to Davidson and Deneckere (1985) 
and Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). 
16
 A formal argument of this result is given in Williamson (1968). Motta (2004) points to Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990) for an even richer model of the effects of efficiency gains. 
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One important note concerning efficiency gains relates to the difficulty competition 
authorities face in estimating the size and extent to which they are present. In any particular 
case where the size of the efficiency gains will be crucial to the outcome, the merging parties 
have a clear incentive to overstate their size (Motta, 2004). At the same time they are in a 
much better position to evaluate how efficiency gains might be achieved than the competition 
authorities. Finally, Motta (2004) emphasizes that competition authorities should regard cost 
savings targeted at fixed costs as inferior to cost savings in variable cost. This is because cost 
savings in fixed costs will have no impact on price, and as such, no impact on consumer 
surplus. Moreover, costs savings should only be considered if they could not have been 
achieved without the merger taking place. Cost savings must be a direct result of the merger. 
Farrell and Shapiro (2001) argue that anti-trust agencies should value synergies, i.e. 
efficiencies achieved through the “intimate integration of the parties’ unique, hard-to-trade 
assets”, more than simple cost saving gains, as these are more likely to be obtainable without 
a merger.  
As should be evident from the preceding discussion, the traditional literature on mergers is 
mainly concerned with whether a merger creates or reinforces a dominant position which 
could be detrimental to competition and welfare, and if so, whether possible efficiency gains 
could offset the negative consequences arising from the abuse of market power. There is no 
mention of the term “two-sided markets”, nor are the important anti-trust implications 
stemming from the unique features of such markets addressed in any way
17
. Evans and 
Schamalansee (2008), who offer a qualitative discussion of anti-trust implications in two-
sided markets, argue that this might not be a problem in all cases as it often is a question of 
degree of two-sidedness. Following a review of recent anti-trust cases involving two-sided 
platforms in the EU and in the US, they conclude that, in some cases, the two-sided aspects of 
a market were so small that they had no real impact on the courts assessment. In other cases, 
two-sidedness represented an interesting consideration but was not ultimately determinative. 
Finally, they also identified cases where the two-sided features of a market were absolutely 
crucial to the analysis. These findings illustrate well that care must be taken by competition 
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 A recent report written jointly by the Law and Economics Center at Tilburg University notes that some 
competition agencies actually have started referring to two-sided terminology, but still, the authors argue, the 
economic principles underlying the concept of two-sided markets and their policy implications have yet to be 
taken fully into account in their decisions. This report, which was commissioned by the Dutch Competition 
Authority (NMa), provides a comprehensive survey of anti-trust cases in the EU and the US. Notable examples 
where courts referred explicitly to two-sided terminology are the Google/DoubleClick and Travelport/Worldspan 
cases. In the report, they also attempt to build a model of merger simulation which is applied to Dutch newspaper 
market. This section is basically an earlier version of Filistrucchi et al. (2010), one of the main authors of the 
NMa report. 
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authorities when assessing mergers in markets that are characterized by a two-sided nature as 
a conventional approach can sometimes lead to outcomes which end up decreasing welfare. 
2.3 Mergers in two-sided markets 
When investigating how research on two-sided markets have dealt with mergers, we find that 
little or no work has been done in this particular area. A handful of qualitative papers point 
out that the implications for anti-trust policy are likely to be significant in most two-sided 
markets, but as it stands, very few have attempted to develop theoretical models like we do in 
this paper
18
. In fact, to our knowledge, there are only two articles that specifically deal with 
mergers in this manner: Leonello (2010) and Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009). We also 
find the previously mentioned article by Godes et al. (2009) to be useful as they compare a 
duopoly- to a monopoly scenario – an analysis which is analogous to the case of a merger 
between duopoly firms in an industry. Before reviewing each of these articles in detail 
however, we present an example from Evans (2003) as it is particularly illustrative of the 
shortcomings of the conventional single-sided approach in the assessments of mergers in two-
sided markets
19
. 
Consider again the opening case of the dating club, what would be the welfare effects if it was 
to merge with a second dating club? It could certainly be the case that the new and bigger 
dating club might exploit its increased market power by charging its clients higher prices. If 
we were to rely on the one-sided anti-trust approach, we would look upon a price increase as 
detrimental to welfare and perhaps seek to prevent the merger from being approved. However, 
because this is a two-sided market, there is one important effect which is left unaccounted for, 
namely that the visitors to the dating club get increased utility because there are more 
potential partners to meet! It is perfectly plausible that the increased value visitors get from 
having a bigger pool of partners to choose from, could neutralize – even outweigh – the lost 
utility due to the price increase. As a result, the merger could actually be welfare enhancing 
rather than welfare detrimental. This is very much contrary to what we would conclude if we 
applied the conventional one-sided terminology, where a price increase always will have a 
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 It is also interesting to note that although a new edition of the US Merger Guidelines was released in 2010, 
replacing the previous Guidelines from 1992, there was no mention of two-sided markets. 
19
 In a more comprehensive study, Evans and Noel (2008) analyze the Google/DoubleClick case and show that 
the traditional Lerner-index is invalidated. They conclude that relying on a conventional approach would have 
produced a significantly different outcome than a correct assessment conducted with a modified Lerner-index. 
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detrimental effect on consumer welfare. In two-sided markets, in contrast, additional utility 
due to network effects could outweigh the negative effect of the price increase. 
Judging from this example, the anti-trust implications for mergers in two-sided markets are 
obvious. Even in the absence of efficiency gains, increased prices can result in enhanced 
welfare because of the higher value users get from joining the platform. It is however by no 
means certain that prices will increase when two firms in a two-sided market merge, and as 
some recent papers have argued, prices could even decrease on at least one side of the market. 
Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) is, to our knowledge, the first paper to specifically study 
mergers in two-sided markets with the use of a theoretical model. They deploy a modified 
Hotelling framework where consumers are assumed to be single-homing – consistent with the 
newspaper market – whereas advertisers have the option of advertising in several newspapers. 
The key finding from their paper is that increased concentration might not lead to higher 
prices on either side. More specifically, they show that a monopolist could choose to set lower 
prices than two firms competing in a duopoly fashion. While the fact that such a result can 
arise is interesting in itself, their model has certain peculiar characteristics which merit further 
discussion.  
In particular, the results from Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) are conditioned on pricing 
below marginal cost on the reader side. If newspapers sell their content at a price below 
marginal cost, additional readers are only valuable to the extent that the revenues which could 
be made by selling their attention to advertisers are greater than the subsidy. How much 
advertising revenue can be made from the additional reader, however, depends on how 
attractive his attention is to advertisers. 
Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) analyze a scenario where there are two competing 
newspapers, and two advertisers – each located at the extremes of the Hotelling line, in 0 and 
1, respectively. Readers are distributed uniformly across the line. A newspaper reader has a 
relative taste for the two newspapers, but also an idiosyncratic taste for newspapers in general. 
No assumptions are imposed on a reader’s attitudes towards advertising. There are two sets of 
readers: “switchers” and “stoppers”. The former refers to readers that are indifferent between 
the two newspapers, and will respond to a price increase of one newspaper by switching to the 
other. Each newspaper also has a base of loyal readers that have a very strong preference for 
the particular product and would rather stop reading newspapers altogether than switch to the 
competing product. These readers are referred to as “stoppers”. 
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Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) assume readers and advertisers to have almost perfectly 
correlated preferences
20
. This implies that advertisers place a higher value on readers located 
closer to them. A newspaper will therefore be able to raise more advertising revenues from 
“stoppers” than “switchers” as the former have a much stronger preference for the paper – and 
thereby a higher probability of buying the advertiser’s product. There are two alternative 
explanations for this. If taken geographically, the Hotelling line can be seen as possible 
locations within a city. An advertiser located in 0, at the outskirts of the city, place more value 
on readers that are located close by, as they are more likely to visit his store. An alternative 
explanation is that more dedicated readers presumably spend more time with the newspaper 
and are more likely to see the ad. This makes them more valuable to advertisers. 
Ultimately then, the key consideration in Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) is how 
advertisers value the “switching” consumer. If advertisers are not willing to pay an 
advertising price which exceeds the loss that the newspaper incurred when selling him a paper 
below marginal cost, the “switcher” is representing negative value for the newspaper. The 
authors show that, for certain parameter values, a newspaper will not find it profitable to 
reduce its price because the additional profit from more “stoppers” purchasing the paper could 
be outweighed by the adverse effect from gaining unprofitable “switchers”. There is, 
however, an indirect effect on the profit of the other newspaper. As the other newspaper will 
have fewer “switchers”, its profit will increase. A monopolist will take this positive effect into 
account, and could choose to set a lower price level than if the two newspapers were 
competing. 
Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) goes on to test their predictions on data from the 
Canadian newspaper market which underwent a wave of mergers in the late 1990s. They find 
that prices were largely unaffected by increased concentration, thereby corroborating their 
results. They do, however, note that there are several shortcomings related to their empirical 
analysis. It is perfectly possible that some mergers were accompanied by efficiency gains, 
which by virtue of lower costs for the merged parties allowed prices to remain unchanged. It 
could also be that some mergers were driven by motives other than increased market power, 
such as for instance empire-building or political motives (Anderson & McLaren, 2008). 
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 But not perfectly, as this would allow newspapers to “screen” readers, i.e. charge the exact price so that they 
only attract the profitable readers. 
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Leonello (2010) performs a similar analysis as she evaluates the welfare implications of a 
merger in a scenario where a merger between two competing firms results in a monopoly. 
Although her model does not address one specific type of media market, she notes that it is 
best understood in the context of the newspaper market. This is because she assumes 
consumer demand to be unaffected by the level of advertising. The novelty of Leonello (2010) 
is that, after the merger, the monopolist offers advertisers in one paper the opportunity to 
advertise also in the other newspaper as part of the deal. For a single price, the advertiser can 
now reach twice as many consumers as before. She refers to this as “interoperability”. 
Leonello (2010) goes on to show that the introduction of advertising bundling by the 
monopolist increases incentives to keep prices low on at least one side of the market. This is 
because interoperability increases the margin which the newspaper can charge on advertising, 
and it thereby becomes profitable to reduce prices on the consumer side in order to stimulate 
demand. Overall, welfare could increase following a merger. This is an important result as it 
is obtained absent efficiency gains. 
It should be noted, however, that the result from Leonello (2010) only holds with network 
externalities of a certain size. When network externalities are sufficiently small, the traditional 
merger analysis will apply and the result will be higher prices on both sides and decreased 
overall welfare. This is consistent with Evans and Schmalansee (2008) who argued that the 
importance of a markets two-sidedness for anti-trust analysis will depend on the degree of 
two-sidedness, i.e. the size of the network externalities. If these are found to be sufficiently 
small, a conventional approach might yet yield satisfactory results. 
Godes et al. (2009) provide key insights into the particular merger case we are analyzing in 
this paper. Although they do not perform a merger analysis per se, their paper is similar to 
ours in that they too compare equilibrium outcomes from monopoly and duopoly competition. 
Their paper is also closely related to Kind et al. (2009a) as both papers investigate how 
competition affects media firms’ choice of revenue strategy with regard to how much 
advertising they choose to bundle and the relative importance of advertising- and consumer 
payments. Recall that Kind et al. (2009a) were able to distinguish between increased 
competitive pressures due to (1) products being closer substitutes, and, (2) there being more 
competing firms in the market in question. Godes et al. (2009), in contrast, have only one 
parameter for competitive pressure as they keep the number of firms fixed. While Kind et al. 
(2009a) consider one media industry in isolation, Godes et al. (2009) was pioneering in that it 
considered competition for advertising also from media firms belonging to a different media 
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industry. This part of their analysis is particularly important considering later trends in media 
markets where media firms face tougher competition for advertising, and increasingly so from 
media firms belonging to other media industries. 
Godes et al. (2009) build their model on the framework of the representative consumer. They 
include a parameter measuring users’ disutility of ads and a substitution parameter measuring 
how the representative consumer perceives a media products’ content to be substitutable with 
that offered by the rival firm. Similarly, advertisers can see the different media outlets as 
substitutable to a lesser or higher degree. The authors first analyze the case of a monopolist 
media firm who faces no competition for users and advertisers. Their first important finding is 
that which they call the “underpricing effect”. Media firms have incentives to charge lower 
content prices, relative to other industries, in order to boost demand, as they can earn a margin 
on them by selling their attention to advertisers. This thereby corroborates the intuition based 
on casual observations from media markets where the content side tends to be subsidized.  
Moreover, Godes et al. (2009) find that, as consumers are more disliking of advertising, the 
less advertising will be bundled and the less revenue can be raised from advertising. This is 
not surprising as a higher ad level would reduce demand on the consumer side. Consumer 
prices and profits, however, follow a U-shaped pattern. Initially, as nuisance increases, the 
most profitable option for the firm is to lower content prices so that it can make a relatively 
healthy margin of advertising on the other side. This is “cheaper” when nuisance is moderate 
as the firm would have to drastically cut the number of ads to attract more consumers. 
However, when nuisance is very strong, the firm must severely limit consumers’ ad exposure 
in order to preserve demand. The importance of consumer payments then increases, and the 
market approaches a regular single-sided one.  
Godes et al. (2009) goes on to analyze the case of within-media competition. A media firm 
now faces competition for both users and advertisers from another firm belonging to the same 
media industry. They show that duopolists will bundle less advertising with content, but that 
the overall level of advertising increases. This implies that advertising rates are unequivocally 
lower in duopoly than in monopoly. Content prices, on the other hand, can increase or 
decrease depending on how substitutable the content of the two media firms is for one 
another. Two forces impact the pricing of content: (1) a traditional downward effect as 
increased competition reduces the benefits of increasing prices, and, (2) an upward effect as 
increased competition diminishes incentives to underprice content because of a lower ad 
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margin. The central finding is that with low substitutability, the latter effect dominates and 
content prices could be higher in duopoly. This is an important result which strengthens 
findings from Leonello (2010) and Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009). 
The novelty of Godes et al. (2009) is that they consider across media competition for 
advertising. They analyze a scenario where a monopolist media firm encounters competition 
for advertising from two other media firms belonging to a different media industry. 
Consumers see the media firms belonging to different media industries as completely 
unrelated. Godes et al. (2009) find that the more the two media industries are substitutable for 
one another, in the eyes of advertisers, the less advertising will the monopolist choose to 
bundle with content. The intuition is that competition from another medium reduces the 
margin which can be made of advertising, and so the monopolist will instead shift his focus to 
the content market where he still has monopoly power. Recall that it was assumed that the two 
media industries were completely unrelated. In the event that advertisers see the different 
media industries as perfect substitutes for advertising, the monopolist will leave the 
advertising market entirely. This illustrates that once we account for competition for 
advertising across different types of media, the merged media firm’s ability to generate 
revenues from advertising might be restricted. In contrast, if advertisers see advertising on 
different media as complements, Godes et al. (2009) show that the monopolist bundles more 
ads and sets lower content prices than competing duopolists. This is because the margin on 
ads increases, further increasing the monopolists’ incentives to underprice content. 
In sum, a review of the existing literature on mergers in two-sided markets, while scarce, give 
clear indications that the existence of network externalities could indeed lead to lower prices 
being charged post-merger on at least one side of the market. We have however seen that 
none of the aforementioned articles explicitly discuss the accompanying welfare implications. 
In our paper, we evaluate the welfare properties of monopoly and duopolistic competition by 
adding up the surpluses of media firms, advertisers and consumers. As far as we know, we are 
the first to perform such an analysis, specifically addressing mergers in two-sided markets. 
Recall from the preceding discussion that qualitative papers such as Evans (2003) also 
provided the intuition for how a merger could be welfare enhancing, even if prices increase on 
the consumer side. In the celebrated example of the dating club, where there are positive 
externalities between the two customer groups, the value of joining the platform increases 
with the number of participants on the other side. In such a scenario, a merger could certainly 
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increase welfare. In a media market, in contrast, the utility of media users do not necessarily 
increase with the number of participating advertisers on the other side. This does not mean, 
however, that a merger in a media market cannot be beneficial for consumers even if content 
prices increase. Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) noted that a merger could bring about a 
change in the quality of media products. This is an important consideration as increased 
quality investments could compensate consumers for a higher price, thereby making a merger 
welfare enhancing even with higher content prices. We have, however, not been able to 
identify papers which analyzes, in a theoretical setting, how incentives to invest in quality 
could change following a merger. In the second of our two models we investigate precisely 
this aspect. As we evaluate a merger’s effect on quality investments and overall welfare, we 
see our paper as an important contribution both to the literature on mergers and two-sided 
markets in general. 
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3. MODEL 1 – EXOGENOUS QUALITY 
In this section we aim to illustrate, through a theoretical model, pricing- and welfare 
implications of mergers in media industries characterized by a two-sided nature. There are a 
total of two media firms, each offering a single media product. Each firm can rely on two 
different sources of income, they sell their content to viewers (readers), and they can sell the 
attention of these viewers to advertisers. At first we consider a scenario where the media firms 
compete in a classic duopoly setting. We then consider a setting where the two firms merge 
into a monopoly, where actions are taken collectively in order to maximize combined profits. 
In Model 1 we assume that each media firm cannot engage in demand expanding activities 
besides those of lowering prices. The quality level of the two media products is thereby fixed 
outside the model. We will alter this assumption in model 2.  
This section is organized as follows. We first outline the basic ingredients of the market 
participants: consumers, advertisers and media platforms. We then report our equilibrium 
outcomes, both for the duopoly- and the monopoly case. Finally we solve for society’s wealth 
level in equilibrium outcomes. 
3.1 Model setup 
3.1.1 The consumer 
Consumer preferences are assumed to be given by the following quadratic utility function due 
to Kind et al. (2009a) with the number of media products fixed to two: 
                               
 
   
           
 
 
   
  
 
 
    
 
   
 
 
                                            
     measures consumption of media product  . The consumption constraint ensures 
participation of both media platforms in the market.            is a parameter, given 
exogenously, measuring the substitutability of the media products’ content, from consumers’ 
perspective.     implies that products are unrelated, with the following result that media 
firms have monopoly power in the supply of content to consumers. In the limit where    , 
products are viewed as perfect substitutes. By normalizing the population size to one we can 
interpret    as each individual’s consumption of product  , or as the number of consumers of 
the good. 
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The specification in       is a modified version of the quadratic utility function proposed by 
Shubik and Levitan (1980). Our motivation for preferring this specification over a standard 
quadratic utility function (SQU), as used by Godes et al. (2009), relates to its appealing 
features regarding comparative statistics
21
. Under SQU the aggregate market demand changes 
with respect to both the substitutability between the products and the number of products. 
Problems posed by changes in the number of products are irrelevant to our analysis as we fix 
the number of products (and firms) to two. Problems do however appear when doing 
comparative statistics with respect to the differentiation parameter because the aggregate 
market size decreases with increased product substitutability, holding prices fixed. 
Substitutability is a good measure for competitiveness in a given industry, as price increases 
intuitively are constrained by consumers’ option to consume similar goods offered by other 
producers. Under SQU a change in parameter   implies an increased competitive pressure, as 
well as a decrease in aggregate demand. Both of these effects are believed to decrease firm 
profits, but we will not be able to isolate the effects from each other. These problems are 
eliminated by employing the specification in      , where aggregate demand is unaffected by 
changes in  , holding prices fixed.  
When deciding how much of a good to consume consumers consider prices in addition to 
utility. We assume that consumers maximize consumer surplus given by the following 
function: 
                                                             
 
   
                                                                        
The formulation in       implies that the subjective cost that consumers pay when consuming 
a media product only contains the explicit prices of the product. In particular we have 
disregarded any disutility that consumers experience with advertisements. The main result is 
that consumers are indifferent about the number of participants on the other side of the two-
sided market, the advertisers. This implies, in our model, that only consumers exert an 
external effect on the advertisers, not the other way around.  
We impose the assumption of a nuisance parameter equal to zero mainly because it greatly 
simplifies algebra as we later characterize complex equilibrium conditions regarding the 
social welfare level. However, there are two alternative arguments for why this assumption is 
                                                          
21
 See Motta (2004) for a general discussion on the properties of the Shubik-Levitan utility function. 
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not too distant from reality. The first relates to consumers’ own ability to avoid ads. It can be 
argued the nuisance effect is negligible in the case of newspapers and magazines as readers 
can easily flip pages containing ads. Empirical observations by Filistrucchi et al. (2010) 
support this argument. Their findings from the Dutch newspaper market suggest no clear-cut 
relation between circulation and the amount of advertising. The same argument does, 
however, not hold for TV channels as commercials interrupt and lengthen programs, resulting 
in “zipping” and “zapping” by viewers (Bellamy & Walker, 1996)22. The alternative argument 
for why consumers do not view ads as a nuisance concerns the benefit they receive from 
being informed about product characteristics and/or prices they previously were unaware of. 
We could expect a positive consumer surplus following trades inspired by the advertisements. 
If this surplus equals the disutility effect there would be no net disutility, just as our modeling 
of consumer surplus suggests. Anderson and Coate (2005) and Peitz and Valletti (2008), who 
both impose disutility from consuming goods with advertisements, circumvents this surplus 
problem by assuming that the price of each advertised good equals the willingness to pay for 
all consumers. In our model we assume that any surplus which consumers receive from 
purchasing advertised goods is already contained in specification      . 
The choice of disregarding the nuisance effect seems consistent with literature modeling the 
two-sided nature of the newspaper- and magazine industry. Gabszewicz et. al (2001) and Kind 
et. al (2009b), who build endogenous differentiation models in a Hotelling setting, both 
assume no disutility from ads. However, seminal articles modeling the two-sidedness of the 
television industry introduce a nuisance parameter in the consumer utility function. This 
includes the before mentioned articles of Anderson and Coate (2005) and Peitz and Valletti 
(2008), as well as Godes et. al (2009), the latter building a model similar to ours. Kind et. al 
(2009a) stresses the important implication that competition in advertising prices, in their 
model, are strategic substitutes when including an ad nuisance parameter. 
3.1.2 Advertisers 
Producers of media products receive the attention of viewers (readers) by selling content. This 
attention can be resold to advertisers, who use advertisements to inform consumers about the 
characteristics, quality and/or price of their product. We follow Anderson and Coate (2005) 
                                                          
22
 “Zipping” refers to fast-forwarding of pre-recorded programs, while “zapping” refers to changing channels 
when commercials are aired. Wilbur (2008), using data on the American viewer population, identifies a negative 
correlation between the duration of commercials during a program and program audience size, indicating that 
viewers avoid commercials. 
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and Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005) in their modeling of the advertisement market. They 
regard advertising as informative because it communicates the existence of new goods and its’ 
characteristics to prospective consumers. Informative advertising is easily amendable to 
welfare analysis as it unambiguously creates surplus distributed to consumers, producers or a 
combination of the two. The surplus effect is harder to define if advertising works in a 
persuasive manner, where the intention is to enhance consumer taste for a specific product
23
.  
We assume that all advertisers are producers of independent new goods, and that they have 
monopoly power in production. We further assume that these goods differ only in the 
probability that consumers find interest in their products. Consumers of different media 
products are identical from advertisers’ perspective, implying that there is no targeted 
advertisement. Advertisers can choose to place ads in either of the media products, or in both. 
These assumptions are sufficient in order to rank advertisers by the expected benefit they 
receive from communicating with consumers. They also imply that the price for contacting a 
viewer (reader), i.e. the price per ad per viewer, is all that matters to advertisers. We can from 
this derive a downward sloping demand function for advertising per viewer in the 
advertisement price.  
The question then arises of how to define the market for ads. We assume that advertisers 
regard advertisements in different media products, within the same media industry, as 
homogenous goods. The motivation for this assumption is that each advertiser can reach 
identical consumers through either of the media products. If we interpret consumption,   , as 
each consumer’s consumption of media product  , then advertisers can reach each consumer 
through both advertising alternatives. Wilbur (2008) estimates the price elasticity in the 
market for advertisements on each US broadcast network to be -2.9, a substantial increase 
from similar estimates found in the 1970s, a period with a more concentrated broadcasting 
industry
24
. This implies an increase in the competition for advertisements, which further 
supports our initial assumption, that advertisers view different media products as closely 
linked substitutes. In our model, we circumvent the aspect of alternative advertising channels, 
such as direct advertising, by assuming that the advertising market is restricted to only the two 
                                                          
23
 See Dixit and Norman (1978) for a seminal paper on persuasive advertising and Butters (1977) for one on 
informative advertising. 
24
 Wilbur (2008) reports that Crandall in 1972 estimated the price elasticity of ads to be -0.45. 
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presented media platforms
25
. By imposing advertising demand to be linear the inverse demand 
function for ads per viewer (reader) can be written as 
                                                                                                                              
where   is the advertising unit price per consumer in any media product,    is product  ’s 
advertising level, and    is that of its’ rival.   and   are both non-negative measures of the 
size of the ad market. An increase in   is interpreted as an increased willingness to pay for 
advertisements, while a decrease in the parameter   implies that the number of advertisers has 
increased. 
3.1.3 Media platforms 
Each media firm can, by bundling content with ads, capture revenue from both the sale of 
content to end-users and from producers advertising their products. Media firm  ’s total profit 
is thus the sum of its profits from the sale of content      , and profits from the sale of 
advertisements      , minus any fixed production costs. The fixed production costs, which 
include those for printing facilities (for newspapers), studios (for radio- and television 
channels), and the exogenously given quality level, are irrelevant for the models equilibrium 
conditions; hence any fixed cost can be normalized to zero.  
Content price            is chosen by media platform  , yielding consumer demand   . 
Marginal production costs are the same for each firm, and fixed to  26. The constraint of non-
negative prices implies that consumers cannot engage in arbitrage purchasing, i.e. the 
purchasing of a product only to receive economic benefit. We do, however, allow for prices to 
be in the interval of           , suggesting that content could be sold at a per unit loss. 
Content profits per media platform   is 
                                                                                                                                           
Advertising profits       depends on the advertising level   , the advertising price per 
consumer  , and the number of consumers   . Any variable costs in placing ads in the media 
platform are normalized to zero. We follow Godes et. al (2009) in assuming that each firm 
chooses how many ads    will be included in the product, with the advertising price per 
                                                          
25
 See Godes et. al (2009) for a discussion concerning advertising competition between firms in different media 
industries.  
26
 While marginal production costs are likely to be negligible in the radio- and television industry, this is not the 
case for the magazine and newspaper industry. A marginal increase in circulation implies more printed copies.   
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consumer endogenously determined through equation      . This suggests that competition 
on advertising levels is a Cournot game, something that merits further discussion. 
We find that, in our model, advertising levels are strategic substitutes. If ad prices were the 
strategic decision variable instead of quantities we would, in equilibrium, end up with the 
classic Bertrand paradox where advertisement price equals marginal cost, for this case zero. 
This result seems inconsistent with both current and historic examples from media industries. 
Traditionally, in the television broadcasting industry there were no mechanism for charging 
viewers, meaning that television channels had to rely solely on ad revenues. This is also the 
case for purely advertisement financed newspapers and magazines. The media platforms 
would, for both presented cases, not be able to finance their content under the Bertrand 
paradox.  
Kind et. al (2009a) argues that media platforms have a per se incentive to set advertising 
prices rather than quantities. This is because, in their model setup, advertising prices are 
strategic substitutes while ad levels are complements. It is well known that competition in 
strategic substitutes is a softer competition form than that of strategic complements (Vives, 
1999). This argument does, however, not hold for our model as media platforms have 
incentives to set ad levels instead of prices to avoid ending up in a Bertrand paradox. If media 
platforms can credibly commit to advertising levels before choosing prices we will, following 
the seminal article by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), end up with the original Cournot 
equilibrium. It can be argued that this is the case for television broadcasters and radio 
channels as advertising levels are an important feature of their long-term commercial 
profile
27
. The argument is not easily applicable to newspapers and magazines in general, as 
separate leaflets can be added to increase space for ads. However, capacity constraints do 
exist on prime locations, such as for front-page ads, and newspapers are here likely to make 
long-term strategic decisions on how much space to allocate to advertisements
28
.  
                                                          
27
 One example of this is Clear Channel Communications who in December 2004 decided to cut the number of 
commercial minutes per hour in order to stem ad pricing weakness for its radio stations (Wilkerson, 2005).  
28
 An alternative explanation for why competition on advertisements is able to avoid the Bertrand paradox, with 
the real market equilibrium being closer to that of Cournot competition, is that advertisers have a per se 
preference for spreading ads across different advertising channels. The motivation for this practice is an 
increased customer recollection of the advertised product. In this case, media platforms carrying the ad would 
not be able to easily attract advertisers of the rival platform, as they would be offering an inferior good; hence 
the market avoids the Bertrand paradox. This is not consistent with the straightforward demand specification in 
      where it is implied that advertisers are indifferent as to whether or not they spread their ads between 
platforms. To allow for this effect we would have to introduce a more complex advertisement demand function. 
In our paper, we have refrained from going further with this particular issue. 
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With advertisement unit price per consumer of  , an ad level of    and    consumers platform 
  will have 
                                                                                                                                                
in advertisement profits. Total profit for media firm   becomes 
                                                                                                                  
If the two platforms merge they will have the following combined monopoly profits: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Specification       implies that there are no efficiency gains or losses resulting from a merger 
between the platforms since the variable and fixed costs have not been altered. The merger 
has thereby only a market power effect on the media market.  
3.2 Equilibrium – duopoly case 
We consider a sequential game in two stages. Media platforms set user prices      and 
advertising levels      non-cooperatively at the first stage, while consumers decide on 
consumption      at the final stage. The sequencing of the game implies that media platforms 
do not commit to setting ad levels before prices, or vice versa. That the consumption decision 
is made at the final stage is quite intuitive when addressing media products as newspaper- and 
magazine purchases, both single time purchases and long time subscriptions, are decided on 
the basis of given prices and product characteristics. We solve the model through backwards 
induction. 
3.2.1 Stage 2 – Consumer demand 
Consumers maximize consumer surplus given by specification       with respect to the 
consumption level of each media product. Setting           yields consumer demand for 
media product  29, 
                                                      
 
 
   
      
   
                                                                    
                                                          
29
 The second order condition is satisfied with           . 
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where    
 
 
   
 
    is the average price of both media products. From       we see that 
demand for product   is decreasing in its own price, and increasing in that of its rival if the 
products are related, i.e.    .  
3.2.2 Stage 1 – Platforms set advertisement levels and content prices 
At stage 1 each media platform maximize individual profits, given by equation      , with 
respect to own consumer price    and advertisement level   . The maximization problem 
gives rise to four first-order conditions when the number of media firms is fixed to two. 
Equilibrium conditions are derived by solving these first-order conditions simultaneously. The 
first order conditions are given by 
   
   
                      
   
   
                      
with complementary slackness for each specification. The complementary slackness 
conditions ensure that content prices and ad levels are non-negative.  
By differentiating media platform  ’s first-order conditions for consumer price    and ad level 
   with respect to the rivals actions,    and    respectively, we can infer that competition on 
content prices are strategic complements if content is related, while competition on ad levels 
are strategic substitutes.  
    
      
 
 
      
            
    
      
         
The result is consistent with both microeconomic intuition and classical literature on 
imperfect competition. Increased rival content price    will, if products are related, increase 
demand for product  ’s own product, which in turn entails a price increase. If the rival 
increases ad level    the price for advertising will, through specification      , decrease. With 
a lower advertising price it will be optimal for media platform   to decrease its ad level.  
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The interior equilibrium conditions for content prices and advertising levels, which are 
symmetric, are found by solving                  , subject to       and      , 
simultaneously for the media platforms. The equilibrium conditions are
30
 
                                            
  
      
      
 
 
      
      
  
 
       
          
   
                                                 
                                                                         
  
 
  
                                                                              
Subscript   denotes the symmetric equilibrium conditions in duopoly competition. Content 
prices are constrained to zero under the following condition: 
  
  
   
      
   
         
    
Content is sold at a loss          if 
  
  
 
           
   
 
Focusing on the interior solution given in specification       we see that the equilibrium price 
consists of three distinct elements,  ,    and    . We refer to the first element,  , as the market 
power factor. This non-negative factor measures to what amount a platform price its content, 
when disregarding the advertisement market, above marginal cost. It depends entirely on a 
platform’s market power in the content market through the substitutability parameter  . This 
is, as earlier emphasized, a measure for the industry’s competitive pressure. There can be no 
markup if the media products are perceived as perfect substitutes      . The market power 
factor increases as the products become more differentiated, and reaches its maximum at 
    where each firm has monopoly power in the sale of content to consumers.  
Element    is referred to as the cost factor, and measures how marginal production costs of 
content are internalized in content prices. Any increase in marginal production costs will, in 
accordance with this effect, lead to higher equilibrium prices. That the cost factor is 
increasing in   implies that any changes in costs will have a larger internalization effect on 
                                                          
30
 The second-order conditions are satisfied as 
    
   
   
     
      
   
    
   
          and 
    
      
   for the 
interior solution. 
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content prices the larger the competitive pressure in the market. This is because full 
internalization will, for firms with market power in the sale of content, lead to unprofitable 
large fluctuations in consumption.   
We follow Godes et. al (2009) in referring to element     as the underpricing effect. It is this 
effect that captures how the equilibrium pricing structure is affected by the two-sided nature 
of the model. Consider, hypothetically, a media industry where there is no ad market, i.e. 
   . Media platforms would then be selling only content to consumers, and the industry 
would be a regular one-sided one. The equilibrium price in such an industry would contain 
only the two first terms in specification      . From this we can infer that the existence of the 
ad market makes the media firm price its content strictly lower than what it would do 
otherwise. The incentive to underprice content emerges from the industry’s positive bilateral 
network externalities, i.e. that advertisers are willing to pay more for ads the more consumers 
use media product  , which in turn increases media firm  ’s ad profits through specification 
     . Media firms thus have an additional incentive to expand own demand    by lowering 
content prices. The underpricing effect increases in the size of the ad market (higher   or 
lower  ) due to higher margin per consumer, which in turn makes the firm more inclined to 
generate additional demand.   
We can also see the intuition behind the underpricing effect quantitatively by looking at 
platform  ’s first-order condition with respect to its content price            :  
                                              
   
   
       
   
   
                                                      
By marginally increasing content price a media firm will benefit due to a one unit increase in 
the price of consumption, which is the left-hand side of specification       . A marginal price 
increase will, however, also reduce demand, and the losses associated are captured by the 
right-hand side. The losses due to contracting demand are comprised in margin loss from the 
content- and advertising market respectively. The margin loss through advertising captures 
that raising prices is more expensive if the market is two-sided, i.e.      . Changes in the 
ad margin per consumer are internalized further by firms operating in competitive industries, 
which is consistent with that of the cost factor. 
If consumers view the media products as perfect substitutes       the equilibrium prices 
given by specification       will constitute a special case of the Bertrand paradox. Content 
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will, conditioned on the existence of an advertisement market, be sold at a loss, and content 
prices will equal marginal cost minus advertisement profits per consumer,    . If prices where 
set in accordance with the standard Bertrand paradox, where prices equal marginal production 
costs, the firms would make zero content profits and positive advertisement profits. Media 
firms would then have an incentive to undercut the content price of their rival in order to 
increase their profits stemming from the sale of ads. The only Nash equilibrium in content 
prices will be that where ad profits per consumer       are exactly offset by the loss of 
content sales per consumer       . From specification       we can also identify a general 
property regarding content prices   : they are falling in the competitive pressure, i.e. 
   
      . The proof is given in appendix A1.  
From specification        we can infer two central properties regarding the advertising level; 
that it is increasing in the size of the advertising market     
          
       , which 
is expected, and that it is unaffected by the substitutability parameter       
       , which 
is a measure for the competitive pressure in the content market. The latter is consistent with 
the findings of Godes et. al (2009) but inconsistent with those of Kind et. al (2009a). 
Summarizing we have: 
Proposition 1 Competing media platforms price their content lower with a larger 
advertisement market and increased competitive pressure     
          
       . They 
choose to bundle more ads with content the larger the advertisement market, while the 
bundling decision is unaffected by the competitive pressure     
          
       . 
3.3 Equilibrium – merger case 
The basics of the model are not altered when going from a duopoly state to monopoly through 
a merger. In particular we consider the same sequencing of the game, i.e. media platforms set 
user prices    and advertising levels    at the first stage, while consumers decide on 
consumption    at the final stage. The merger case differs from the duopoly one as user prices 
and advertising levels now are set cooperatively by the platforms.  
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3.3.1 Stage 2 – Consumer demand 
Consumers do not take the particular ownership structure between media platforms into 
consideration when deciding on consumption, and consumer demand for media product   is 
thus given by equation      .  
3.3.2 Stage 1 – Platforms set advertisement levels and content prices cooperatively 
In stage 1 each media platform maximize combined profits, given by equation      , with 
respect to content price    and advertisement level   . The maximization problem gives rise to 
the following four first-order conditions: 
   
   
                      
   
   
                      
with complementary slackness for each condition. 
We choose to focus on the symmetric solution of the proposed maximization problem i.e. 
content prices and advertising levels are set equal between the platforms. There are, however, 
conditions in which the merged platform will find it profitable to choose asymmetric content 
prices and ad levels. We refrain from going further with an equilibrium analysis on this 
particular matter, but do nevertheless provide a discussion of when it is, and when it is not, 
optimal for the merged platforms to choose an asymmetric solution. 
First consider what happens to combined content profits if content prices are set 
asymmetrically. Aggregate demand for content          
     
 
  is only dependent on 
the aggregate price level        , hence any asymmetries in content prices will only have a 
demand shifting effect through substitution, from one platform to the other. Consumers will 
respond to asymmetric prices by consuming more of the cheaper good and less of the 
expensive good if content is related      . This will shift consumption away from the 
relatively profitable good and towards the relatively unprofitable one, causing a decrease in 
content profits for the merged platform. Sale of content therefore creates a disincentive to set 
prices asymmetrically.   
While the merged platform should set symmetric content prices to maximize content profits 
the same argument does not apply to advertisement profits. If content prices are set 
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asymmetrically consumers would, as previously emphasized, consume more of the cheaper 
good and correspondingly less of the expensive one. This will in turn increase the value of 
placing an ad in the platform where consumption has increased, and decrease the value of 
advertisements in the other platform. The platform can benefit from this by placing more ads 
in the platform where consumption is the highest, while at the same time keeping aggregate 
ad level         fixed. This argument can also be seen by observing the equation for 
combined advertisement profits                    , which is maximized by directing 
consumption and ad levels to only one of the two platforms.  
The advertisement market does therefore create an incentive to set asymmetric content prices, 
which should be weighed against the loss encountered in content profits. Two factors are 
crucial in deciding which of these factors dominate. The first is the relative importance of the 
advertisement market to the content market, measured by the advertisement parameters   and 
 . The second is the substitutability parameter  . This parameter is crucial in deciding how 
much loss in content profits one will have to endure to create a sufficient shift in demand. The 
loss will be relatively large if consumers are not prone to substitute between platforms 
     . None of the reported incentives for symmetric, or asymmetric, content prices are 
present if platform content is entirely unrelated      , as there is no demand shifting effect.  
Assuming that it will be optimal for the merged platform to set symmetric content prices 
           yields the result that ad levels can arbitrarily be set equal between the 
platforms           . Maximizing combined platform profits, given by      , subject to 
     ,      ,       and the symmetry restrictions, yields the following derived first order 
conditions:  
      
   
            
      
   
            
with complementary slackness for both conditions. Subscript    denotes that symmetry in 
content prices and advertisement levels has been imposed. By setting the first-order 
conditions equal to zero                           we characterize the interior 
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solution for optimal pricing and advertisement level for merged platforms. Solving them 
simultaneously yields the following equilibrium outcome
31
: 
                                                               
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
   
                                                                    
                                                                        
  
 
  
                                                                              
Subscript  symbolizes merged platforms. Content price   
  is constrained to zero if 
  
  
             
    
while content is sold at a loss    
       if 
  
  
     
Equation        shows that the interior equilibrium price for content set by the merged 
platforms also can be divided in three distinct elements,  ,    and    . The elements are, 
respectively, referred to as the market power factor, the cost factor and the underpricing 
effect, just as for the content price under duopoly competition. The market power factor is a 
price premium stemming from the merged platforms exerting their monopoly power in the 
content market. The cost factor represents how marginal production costs are accounted for in 
the pricing of content. Element     is the underpricing effect which captures the two-sided 
nature of our media market modeling, in particular that platforms have an incentive to 
underprice their content due to the existence of the market for advertisements. A larger ad 
market (higher   or lower  ) will lead to increased underpricing.  
Notice that content prices set by merged platforms is unaffected by the competitive pressure 
in the content market, measured by the parameter  . This is natural as the merger creates a 
monopoly that eliminates all rivalry between platforms. This result would, however, not 
persist if we employed a standard quadratic utility function, instead of the modified 
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 The second-order conditions are satisfied as the Hessian matrix becomes negative definite with   
       
   
  
     
       
   
               and 
    
      
   if symmetry is imposed. 
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specification due to Shubik & Levitan (1980), as changes in   would affect the aggregate 
market size.  
The merged platform sets advertisement levels per platform given by specification       . 
From this we can infer that the advertising level is increasing in the size of the ad market 
    
          
       .  
Summing up we have: 
Proposition 2 Merged media platforms price their content lower with a larger advertisement 
market     
       , and choose to bundle more ads with content the larger the 
advertisement market     
       . 
3.4 Equilibrium outcomes – duopoly vs. merger 
We will in this section compare the equilibrium outcomes of the non-cooperative and 
cooperative cases. We first focus on the decision of advertising level before turning to the 
content pricing decision.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
A platform engaging in duopoly competition sets advertising level   
  
 
  
 in equilibrium, 
while merged platforms maximize combined profits by setting ad level   
  
 
  
. From this 
we can infer that firms choose to bundle less advertisement with content if they cooperatively 
set advertising level. If platforms set advertising levels non-cooperatively they will increase 
ad level until their own marginal revenue equals marginal cost of advertisements. The firms 
do not take into consideration that increased ad level in their platform creates a negative 
externality on the other platform’s advertisement income through a lower advertisement price 
 . Platforms who combine their actions take this externality into account by lowering their ad 
level. This results in a higher advertisement price   through specification      , and a higher 
advertisement revenue per consumer     
  
  
  
 
  
  
    
  . 
We consider the three elements of the content price separately when comparing the content 
prices charged by platforms engaging in duopoly competition and by platforms coordinating 
their efforts. The market power factor for a duopoly firm equals 
      
    
, which is decreasing in 
competitive pressure   and ranges in the interval     
 
 
  . Merged platforms have a 
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corresponding factor equaling 
 
 
. From this we can infer that duopoly platforms have a lower 
market power factor in the sale of content, except for the case where content is unrelated 
     .  
The cost factor equals 
      
    
 for the duopoly platform and 
 
 
 for the merged platforms. The 
cost factor for the duopoly platform is increasing in   and ranges in the interval   
 
 
    . This 
shows that marginal production costs have a greater influence on a duopoly platform’s content 
price than for a merged platform, apart from in the case where content is unrelated.  
Comparing the underpricing effect in the two scenarios yields some particularly interesting 
insights. While the effect for the merged platform is fixed at 
  
   
, the effect for duopoly 
platforms, which equals 
       
        
, ranges in the interval   
  
   
 
  
  
  . The underpricing effect is 
increasing in   for a duopoly platform. We see that the merged platforms have a larger 
underprizing effect than duopoly platforms that face no competition in the content market 
     . This is because the merged platforms have monopoly power in the advertising 
market, and they capitalize on this to raise ad margin per consumer. Because merged 
platforms have higher supplementary revenues per consumer they have a larger incentive to 
expand demand by lowering content prices. However, we also noted that the underpricing 
effect is increasing in the competitive pressure in the content market under duopoly 
competition.   
 
  
 is the unique parameter value for which the monopoly power effect in the 
ad market is neutralized by the increased underprizing effect accredited higher competitive 
pressure. The underpricing effect for merged platforms will, in this state, equal that of the 
duopoly platforms.  
Summing up the differences in content prices we see that the market power factor for merged 
platforms is greater than, or equal to, that of duopoly platforms. The cost factor for the 
duopoly platforms is greater, or equal to, that of the merged platforms, while we cannot 
determine which of the two scenarios has the larger underpricing effect unless we make 
assumptions on the content substitutability parameter  32. It is not clear, when combining the 
three factors, if the content pricing level is higher for the merged platform or the ones 
                                                          
32
 Some assumptions on the parameter values  ,   and   must be made to have strictly positive consumption of 
content in the merger and duopoly case. We assume that the parameter values are such that     
  
  
  . 
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engaging in duopoly competition. It should, however, be noted that when content 
substitutability is low       the only content price factor that separates the merged 
platforms from the duopoly ones is the underpricing one, which is larger for the merger case. 
The result is that platforms that merge set lower content prices, in spite of increased market 
power, a result counterintuitive to traditional theory on one-sided markets
33
. Figure 1 displays 
content prices for the merged platforms and duopoly platforms with the substitutability 
parameter   on the horizontal axis34.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates that the merged platforms set lower content prices if products are 
sufficiently differentiated. This is a general result, conditioned on the existence of the 
advertising market, and the proof is given in appendix A2. The illustration shows that content 
prices charged by duopoly platforms are lower than that of merged platforms for sufficiently 
high substitutability of content. However, this is not a general result, and a proof is given in 
appendix A3. 
Summarizing we have: 
Proposition 3 Merged platforms charge lower content prices than duopoly platforms if the 
products are sufficiently differentiated. The merged platforms bundle less ads with content 
than duopoly platforms. 
                                                          
33
 See Motta (2004) for analysis on the price implications of horizontal mergers in one-sided markets.  
34
 Chosen parameter values are      ,     and    . 
 
 
Figure 1 – Equilibrium Prices for Content 
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3.5 Welfare 
In this section we explicitly solve for society surplus of our model for both equilibrium 
scenarios; the merger case and duopoly competition. Following earlier discussion on 
economic welfare we choose to ascribe equal weight to consumer- and producer surplus. The 
question then emerges of how to define consumers and producers in a two-sided media 
market. We define consumers of content as one type of consumers and the media platforms as 
the producers. Advertisers, who by definition also are producers of goods, are defined as 
another type of consumers as they purchase a service, the attention of potential buyers, from 
the platforms. While the literature is adamant that the existence of advertising does affect 
welfare level via platform profits, there is no clear consensus as to how one should include 
surplus stemming explicitly from trade in goods inspired by ads (Anderson and Gabszewicz, 
2005). As noted earlier, we follow Anderson and Coate (2005) in their modeling of the 
advertisement market, in particular by assuming that advertising works in an informative 
manner. Producer profits stemming from trades inspired by advertisements are then defined as 
the advertisement surplus, and the surplus is included in the aggregate welfare level. We first 
consider the three surplus elements separately under the two equilibrium scenarios; consumer 
surplus, advertising surplus and platform profits, before combining the elements to examine 
aggregate welfare level. 
It is important to highlight that we use interior equilibrium content prices when calculating 
welfare measures. Consequently, we assume that parameters are such that platforms do not 
find it optimal to have a negative pricing level of content.  
3.5.1 Consumer surplus 
Equilibrium consumer demand is found by solving equation       subject to equilibrium 
content prices, which are given by specifications       and        for the duopoly and merger 
case, respectively. This yields the following equilibrium consumption levels for each media 
platform: 
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By inserting equilibrium consumption and content pricing levels into the consumer surplus 
equation in       we solve explicitly for consumer surplus. 
                                                  
  
      
        
     
  
  
 
 
                                                       
                                                           
  
 
 
     
  
  
 
 
                                                                
Consumer surplus hinges entirely on the content price level under symmetry, in which it is 
decreasing        
 
 
      
  
 
 . We can thus, following the discussion on equilibrium 
prices, not determine which competition scenario is better for consumers. A horizontal merger 
in a two-sided market, which works to create monopoly power in the market, may thus be 
welfare enhancing for the consumers of content. The result is profoundly inconsistent with 
traditional literature on horizontal mergers, where loss to consumers is expected to more than 
offsets increased firm profits, absent efficiency gains (Motta, 2004). It is the market’s two-
sided nature that produces the surprising result, in particular, that an increased underprizing 
effect potentially can result in lower content prices. While inconsistent with conventional 
economic theory, these findings are in line with conclusions made by Leonello (2010) on two-
sided markets.   
3.5.2 Advertising surplus 
Equilibrium advertising price per ad per consumer    is found by solving equation       
subject to equilibrium ad levels, given by        and       . The equilibrium advertising 
price is   
  
 
 
 under duopoly competition and   
  
 
 
 for the platform merger case. 
Advertising surplus per ad per consumer can be found by subtracting the equilibrium 
advertising price from the advertisers’ willingness to pay for the ad. Summarizing this surplus 
across all ads in both platforms         yields total advertising surplus with a symmetric 
consumption level of each platform equal to one. We adjust for the consumption level by 
multiplying this surplus with the symmetric consumption level of the platforms. Advertising 
surplus is given by 
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The expressions for advertising surplus     
  and    
   captures that producers of new goods 
benefit from a lower advertising price   and higher consumption level   . While a lower 
advertising price makes it cheaper to reach each consumer, higher consumption will increase 
the expected number of trades inspired by an advertisement. 
It becomes evident by comparing equations        and        that we cannot infer under 
which scenario advertisers are better-off. Advertisers will, in particular, benefit from a merger 
in a two-sided market if parameter values are such that the second factor of        becomes 
very small. In this case, the adverse effect of increased advertisement price will be dominated 
by the favorable effect of increased consumption. 
3.5.3 Producer surplus 
Producer surplus equals the combined profits of the two media platforms in equilibrium. 
Equilibrium profit for duopoly platforms is found by solving equation       subject to 
equilibrium content prices, advertising levels and consumption. Platform profits in the merger 
case is found by solving the expression for combined profits, given by equation      , subject 
to equilibrium conditions. Producer surplus in equilibrium is given by 
                                      
     
  
           
       
     
  
  
 
 
                                           
                                                     
    
  
 
 
     
  
  
 
 
                                                         
Two central properties concerning producer surplus in duopoly are established through 
equation       . The first is that it is decreasing in the substitutability parameter  35. Platform 
profits are thereby minimized when content is completely undifferentiated      , and it is 
from this we derive the second property. If content is perfectly substitutable we will, as 
stressed during the equilibrium content price section, obtain the special case of the Bertrand 
paradox where ad profits are exactly offset by the loss incurred from the sale of content. In 
this case, each platform makes zero equilibrium profits. 
                                                          
35
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By comparing equations        and        we are able to conclude that producer surplus 
under duopoly is strictly below that of the merger case, if the market is two-sided. This 
ensures that duopoly platforms always have a profit incentive to merge. The proof is given in 
appendix A4.  
3.5.4 Aggregate welfare level 
The model’s aggregate welfare level is found by adding together consumer surplus, 
advertising surplus and producer surplus             . The equilibrium welfare 
level is 
           
  
   
        
     
  
  
             
  
  
        
  
  
                  
                                  
  
 
  
     
  
  
        
  
  
  
  
  
                                          
From equations        and        we can infer some central characteristics of the aggregate 
welfare level. A larger advertising market (higher   or lower  ) yields a positive shift in 
welfare under both scenarios. The opposite is true if marginal productions costs of content 
increase (higher  ). The welfare level increases with higher competitive pressure in duopoly36, 
whereas it is independent of   under the merger case. The former shows that, in a duopoly 
market setting, the benefit to consumers and advertisers from higher competitive pressure 
outweighs the profit loss of platforms. This supports the classic anti-trust account that 
competition benefits society as a whole. 
Does this imply that a merger between media platforms, which has an unfavorable impact on 
the industry’s competitive conditions, will harm society? By examining equations        and 
       together, we are able to conclude that this is not necessarily the case. There are 
parameter values such that the welfare level under the merger case exceeds that of duopoly 
competition. In appendix A5 we show, for unrelated content      , the circumstances under 
which society will be better off with a merger than duopoly competition. Figure 2, which 
                                                          
36
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measures wealth level on the vertical axis and   on the horizontal axis, illustrates a scenario 
where the welfare level with merged platforms exceeds that of duopoly competition
37
. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates, together with the preceding discussion, that a horizontal merger in a two-
sided market can indeed enhance society surplus, even in the absence of efficiency gains. This 
result, however, will not persist if we exclude the advertisement market from the model, i.e. 
considering merely a one-sided media market. The proof of this is given in appendix A6. In 
this case, the move to a monopoly will impose a loss to the consumers of content that 
dominates the beneficial effect of increased platform profits. From this we can infer that it is 
the two-sided nature of the model that enables a welfare enhancing horizontal merger. In 
particular, platforms will utilize their increased market power by raising ad margin per 
consumer. Consumers can benefit from lower content prices through an increased 
underpricing effect, while advertisers will benefit if increased consumption outweighs the 
adverse effect of higher advertising prices. This, combined with higher platform profits, 
illustrates how a merger in a two-sided market can benefit society as a whole.  
Summing up we have: 
Proposition 4 A horizontal merger between duopoly platforms can be welfare enhancing if 
the media market is two-sided. 
                                                          
37
 Chosen parameter values are      ,     and      . 
 
  
Figure 2 – Aggregate Welfare Level  
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4. MODEL 2 – ENDOGENOUS QUALITY 
Recall from Model 1 that lowering content prices was the only way in which a platform could 
expand consumer demand. In this section we alter this assumption, specifically by allowing 
platforms to make quality investments, i.e. investments that increase their product’s 
attractiveness among the consumer audience. The chief example of quality investments in 
media industries is that of improvements in journalism. The basic ingredients of Model 1 are 
not altered when introducing endogenously chosen quality levels. We still consider two media 
platforms that first compete in a duopoly setting, and then maximize combined profits 
following a merger. In addition to choosing content prices and ad levels, the platforms must 
now decide on quality levels. 
The section is organized as follows. We first explicate how the market participants 
(consumers, advertisers and media platforms) are affected by the introduction of endogenous 
quality levels. We then report our equilibrium outcomes in content prices, advertising levels 
and quality levels before finally solving for welfare levels.  
Before proceeding with the model specifics we find it appropriate to elaborate on how content 
quality is understood in the context of our model. We define quality as a process to increase 
willingness to pay among consumers. All consumers agree on the preferred mix of 
characteristics of products with different quality, and, consequently, there exists a natural 
ranking at equal prices. As consumers are in agreement regarding the associated positive 
utility effects, quality improvements are easily accommodated in the representative 
consumer’s preferences. 
4.1 Model setup 
4.1.1 The consumer 
Consumer preferences are given by the quadratic utility function in equation       but with an 
additional quality term. The adapted utility function is given by 
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where    denotes the quality level of platform  . The quality modeling in       follows that of 
Eika and Solheimsnes (2010), and captures that the marginal utility of consumption increases 
with higher product quality. In model 1,    was fixed to zero. 
Consumers maximize consumer surplus given by the following function: 
                                                             
 
   
                                                                        
where utility level   is given by equation      . Equation       reveals that advertisement is 
assumed not to be a nuisance for consumers, a model characteristic highlighted in the setup of 
Model 1.  
4.1.2 Advertisers 
Advertisers are assumed not to care directly about the quality levels of the platforms, 
indicating that no additional value is assigned for ads bundled with higher quality content. 
The assumption is consistent with earlier modeling, in particular that consumers are identical 
in advertisers’ perspective. This allows us to use the same modeling of the ad market as 
Model 1, where the inverse demand function for ads per viewer (reader) was 
                                                                                                                              
  is the unit advertising price per consumer, and       is the aggregate advertisement level. 
Although advertisers do not assign explicit value to content quality, they are indirectly 
affected as quality improvements affect consumption levels. If platforms with higher quality 
have higher consumption levels, then ads placed in this platform will have a higher inherent 
value. This is because the number of expected trades in goods inspired by the ad is higher.  
4.1.3 Media Platforms 
Each media platform has two revenue sources: the sale of content to consumers, and the sale 
of consumers’ attention to producers advertising their new goods. Content quality is, in 
addition to content prices and advertisement levels, chosen by media platforms in order to 
maximize platform profits. Specifically, if higher quality increases demand, there will be 
higher ad revenues following quality improvements. Increased consumer demand will also 
result in increased content profits if content is sold with a positive margin       , and 
decreased profits if it is sold at a loss       .  
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Quality improvements, for example through investments in journalism, have associated costs. 
We capture this by including a variable investment cost given by 
 
 
   
 .     is a parameter 
measuring the cost of investing in quality, which is assumed to be sufficiently large to fulfill 
all second-order conditions. The convexity of the investment cost captures that quality 
improvements are more expensive the higher the initial quality level, a realistic characteristic 
of media industries. We do not alter other assumptions given in Model 1, and total profit for 
media firm   then becomes 
                                                         
 
 
   
                                                           
Combined platform profits are 
                                                                                                                                                 
implying that there are no efficiency gains in the cost of quality investments following a 
merger. As for Model 1, the merger has thereby only a pure market power effect on the media 
market. 
4.2 Equilibrium – duopoly case 
The sequencing of the game is as follows: in the first stage, platforms choose quality levels 
simultaneously with advertising levels and content prices, before consumers decide on 
consumption at the final stage. The sequencing implies that media platforms do not commit to 
a fixed quality level before deciding on content prices and ad levels, or vice versa. 
Consumption of content is chosen on the basis of given platform price- and quality 
characteristics. The model is solved through backward induction.  
4.2.1 Stage 2 – Consumer demand 
At the final stage consumers maximize consumer surplus, given by equation      , with 
respect to consumption level of each platform. Setting          yields two first-order 
conditions that are solved simultaneously to derive consumer demand for media product  38: 
                                            
 
 
   
      
   
 
     
   
                                                           
                                                          
38
 The S.O.C. for the consumer is satisfied with          . 
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where    
 
 
   
 
    and   
 
 
   
 
    denotes the average price- and quality levels, 
respectively. Equation       reveals that demand for media product   is decreasing in its own 
price and increasing in quality level. Substitution effects arise if products are somewhat 
related      . In this case, consumption of product  ,   , decreases if the rival firm increases 
its good’s attractiveness, either by lowering content prices or by raising the inherent quality of 
the good through quality investments.  
4.2.2 Stage 1 – Platforms set price-, advertisement- and quality levels 
Media platform   maximizes individual profits given by equation      , subject to       and 
     , with respect to content price   , advertising level    and quality level   . The 
maximization problem gives rise to the following six first-order conditions: 
   
   
                      
   
   
                      
   
   
             
with complementary slackness for the conditions on content price and ad level. Quality levels 
are, as strategic actions between platforms, unrelated  
    
      
   . Solving         
                    simultaneously for the two media platforms gives rise to the 
following interior, symmetric equilibrium in content prices, advertising levels and quality 
investments: 
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Subscript   denotes that platforms here engage in duopoly competition. Content prices are set 
equal to zero, due to the non-negativity constraint, if the parameter values are such that 
    
  
 
  
  
    
   
   
        
 
    
while equilibrium advertisement levels, given by equation   2.8 , are always non-negative.  
All second-order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied with         
  
   
      
, 
which we assume always to be the case
39
. By imposing         
  we obtain the result that 
the common denominator factor in   
  and   
 ,               , is strictly positive.  
Equilibrium advertisement level   
 , given by equation      , is increasing in the size of the 
ad market     
          
       , and independent of the competitive pressure in the 
content market     
       . These findings are consistent with those found in Model 1.  
From equation       we can infer some central properties regarding equilibrium quality level, 
  
 ; it is increasing in the competitive pressure     
        and falling in the quality 
investment cost parameter     
       40. The latter is expected as higher   increases the 
marginal cost of quality investments. The former result captures that the demand expanding 
effect of quality improvements is larger if content is less differentiated. This is because more 
consumers are prone to switch between platforms if switching is “cheap”. Equation       also 
captures that equilibrium quality level is decreasing in marginal production costs of content 
    
       , and increasing in the size of the advertisement market     
       . A 
higher   will increase a platform’s costs in sale of content, making it less profitable to 
increase demand. A larger ad market will, on the other hand, increase a platform’s revenue 
per consumer, which in turn increases the marginal benefit of investments in quality.  
                                                          
39
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 , is negative definite with 
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   . We assume that     
  
  
   to ensure that consumption, 
  
  
      
              
     
  
  
 , is strictly positive. 
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As in model 1, we separate content prices in duopoly, given by equation      , into three 
distinct elements,  ,    and    , respectively. Element   is referred to as the market power factor 
and measures the amount to which a platform prices its content above marginal cost when 
disregarding the advertising market. Platforms that offer undifferentiated content       in a 
duopoly setting do not price content above marginal production costs. However, it cannot be 
inferred that the market power factor is decreasing in the substitutability parameter  . The 
intuition for this is that a  
higher   results in a higher quality level     
        which in turn raises consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the good. This effect is especially large for low levels of  , and if 
  
 
 
 the quality effect will dominate the adverse competition effect. It can be identified that 
the market power factor is decreasing in  . The intuition is that a lower quality level 
decreases consumer’s willingness to pay for content.  
Element    is refered to as the cost factor and measures how marginal production costs are 
internalized in the pricing of content. The cost factor is, in absolute terms, increasing in  . 
This implies that changes in marginal costs are further internalized in the content price of 
platforms that face harder competitive pressure.  
While we through assumptions on the investment cost parameter   can infer that the 
denominator of    is strictly positive, the same cannot be concluded for the numerator. 
Specifically, the cost factor will be negative if          
  
 
 
  and positive if    
 
 
   . A 
negative cost factor     
        indicates that increased marginal production costs results 
in lower equilibrium content prices, a fairly counterintuitive result that merits further 
discussion. The result stems from the introduction of endogenous quality levels. We can 
separate the pricing impact of changes in marginal production costs,  , in two isolated parts, a 
direct effect and an indirect quality effect. The direct effect captures that an increase in   
results in a higher optimal content price. Increased marginal production costs do, however, 
also weaken a platform’s incentive to invest in quality. The result of this is lower content 
prices, as lower content quality reduces consumers’ willingness to pay for the good. This 
indirect quality effect will dominate the direct one if changes in   results in a large enough 
alteration of quality level. Specifically, this is the case when quality investments are 
sufficiently “cheap”    
 
 
 . The direct effect dominates if   
 
 
, and they offset each other 
perfectly at   
 
 
  with the result that content prices,   
 ,  are independent of marginal 
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production costs,  . Figure 3 encapsulates at what values the cost effect is negative (the grey 
shaded area), and when it is positive. Recall that   is assumed to be strictly above       
 . 
 
Element     captures how the unique relationship between advertisers and consumers in the 
two-sided model affects equilibrium content prices. The element is referred to as the 
underpricing effect. The effect is increasing, in absolute value, in the substitutability 
parameter  . 
Under model 1 we highlighted a platforms’ incentive to expand demand by lowering content 
prices as advertising income raises revenue per consumer. While this direct effect persists 
when introducing endogenous advertising levels, the advertising market now also impacts 
equilibrium content prices indirectly. Increased advertisement revenue per consumer raises a 
platform’s incentive to expand demand through quality improvements. Higher content quality 
will, in itself, raise consumers’ willingness to pay for the good, resulting in higher equilibrium 
content prices. The indirect quality effect dominates the direct one if          
  
 
 
 . The 
existence of the advertisement market will, in this case, lead to higher equilibrium content 
prices, a somewhat surprising result that can be related directly to a negative cost effect. It is, 
however, important to emphasize that consumers are not necessarily hurt by the existence of 
the ad market, even though content prices would be lower without it. The advertisement 
market will, following equation      , lead to higher quality level of content, which is, by 
itself, positive for consumers.  
 
  
Figure 3 – Positive vs. Negative Cost Effect  
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Comparative statistics concerning equation       yield somewhat surprising results. In 
particular, we are not able to infer that equilibrium content prices,   
 , is decreasing in the 
competitive pressure of the content market,  . Content pricing level is increasing in   if 
         
  
 
 
 41. The intuition behind this is that higher content substitutability results in a 
positive shift in quality level, which in turn increases consumers’ willingness to pay for the 
good by an amount that more than offsets the adverse price effect of increased competition. 
Equilibrium content price is decreasing in the quality investment cost parameter      
     
  42. This is expected as higher investment costs will lower quality level, weakening 
consumers’ willingness to pay for content. 
Summarizing yields: 
Proposition 5 Competing media platforms invest more in quality with a larger advertisement 
market and increased competitive pressure     
          
       . Larger 
advertisement market or increased competitive pressure can result in both lower and higher 
content prices, depending on the quality investment cost parameter,  .  
4.3 Equilibrium – duopoly case 
We now consider the case where the two media platforms maximize profits cooperatively 
following a merger. The basics of the model are not altered, i.e. media platforms set content 
prices   , advertising levels    and quality levels    at the first stage, while consumers decide 
on consumption    at the final stage. 
4.3.1 Stage 2 – Consumer demand 
Consumers maximize consumer surplus, given by equation      , on the basis of given 
content characteristics and prices.  Consumer demand for media product  ,   , is then given by 
equation      . 
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4.3.2 Stage 1 – Platforms set price-, advertisement- and quality levels cooperatively 
At the first stage, each media platform maximize combined profits, given by equation      , 
with respect to content price   , advertising level    and investments in content quality   . 
This gives rise to the following six first-order conditions, 
   
   
                      
   
   
                      
   
   
             
with complementary slackness for the conditions concerning content prices and advertising 
levels.  
Under model 1 we highlighted the merged platforms incentives in setting symmetric or 
asymmetric content prices and advertising levels. It was concluded that content profits form 
an incentive to set symmetric content prices, while the opposite was true for advertisement 
profits. While these results persist when introducing endogenous quality levels, we now also 
have to consider whether quality levels should be set symmetrically or asymmetrically. 
Though choosing to focus on the symmetric equilibrium when explicitly solving the 
maximization problem, we will first provide a discussion around the platforms’ decision of 
quality investments.  
Asymmetric quality levels constitute an alternative to content prices in generating asymmetric 
consumption with the aim of increasing combined ad profits                    . 
While the losses encountered with asymmetric content prices arose from increased relative 
consumption of the good with lowest content profit margin, the losses encountered in quality 
levels have a somewhat different source. Asymmetric quality levels have higher combined 
investment costs than symmetric ones, which is due to the convexity of the quality investment 
cost function  
 
 
   
  . The convexity implies that additional quality improvements for a high 
quality product are costly, and this investment cost will not be fully compensated by a 
symmetric quality drop for the inferior product. The magnitude of the increase in combined 
investment costs depends crucially on the parameters   and  . Higher quality investment 
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costs will increase the associated cost of asymmetric quality. Increased substitutability 
between goods will, on the other hand, reduce the associated cost as a lower asymmetry in 
quality will be required to create an adequate shift in demand.   
Another question to consider for the merged firm is whether to keep both media platforms in 
its product portfolio. This question was not relevant under Model 1 as none of the goods had 
associated retrievable fixed costs. In particular, the merged platforms can now reduce their 
quality investment costs by removing one of the media platforms from the market. This 
practice will, on the other hand, result in decreased consumption as consumers may not wish 
to substitute towards the alternative platform. The decreased consumption effect reduces 
platform revenue, and is particularly large if content is completely differentiated      . The 
effect is negligible if goods are perceived as perfect substitutes      .  
We assume that parameters are such that it will be optimal to keep both goods in the product 
portfolio, and to set symmetric content prices            and quality levels        
   . Advertising levels can then, arbitrarily, be set equal between the platforms        
   . Maximizing combined platform profits, subject to      ,      ,       and the symmetry 
restrictions, yields the following three first-order conditions: 
      
   
            
      
   
            
      
   
   
with complementary slackness for the two first conditions. Solving            
                          simultaneously yields the succeeding unique, interior 
equilibrium: 
                                          
  
  
      
 
 
       
         
  
 
        
         
   
                                               
                                                                        
  
 
  
                                                                              
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
64 
 
                                                       
  
 
    
     
  
  
                                                             
Prices are, due to the non-negativity constraint, restricted to zero if 
    
  
 
  
  
              
    
while equilibrium advertising levels are always non-negative. The second-order conditions for 
profit maximization are satisfied with         
  
 
 
, which we assume to be the case
43
. This 
assumption also ensures that the common denominator factor in equilibrium content price and 
quality level,     , is strictly positive. 
The merged platforms set quality level optimally in accordance with equation       . 
Equilibrium quality level is decreasing in marginal production costs of content     
     
  . This is expected as higher costs will decrease profits per consumer, making demand 
expanding quality investments less profitable. Conversely, a larger ad market will increase 
profits per consumer, resulting in higher quality investments     
       . Furthermore, 
equilibrium quality level is decreasing in the cost of quality improvements     
       . 
Equilibrium content price for merged platforms, given by equation       , is as for the 
duopoly case, divided in three distinct elements. Element  , referred to as the market power 
factor, is a monopoly platform’s price premium in the sale of content. The factor is decreasing 
in  , and the explanation is that a lower quality level decreases consumers’ willingness to pay 
for the product. Element    and    , referred to as the cost factor and the underpricing effect, 
respectively, displays how marginal production costs and advertising profits per consumer are 
internalized in the prizing of content. Element    and     will change signs if          
  
 
 
  
implying that lower marginal production costs, or a larger advertisement market, will result in 
a higher equilibrium content price. This counterintuitive result, the rationale for which we 
explained under the duopoly section, stems from a large quality level internalization that in 
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 , is negative definite with 
  
 
 
 and     . This fulfills all second-order conditions after symmetry has been imposed.  
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turn raises consumers’ willingness to pay for the product sufficiently to create an opposite 
pricing effect.  
Equilibrium pricing level of content is, for the merger case, decreasing in the quality 
investment cost parameter      
       44. This is an indirect effect accredited to lower 
willingness to pay for a product of lesser quality. Equation        also demonstrates that the 
content pricing level in the merger case is unaffected by the competitive pressure in the 
content market, measured by the substitutability parameter  . The result can be accredited to a 
competition-eliminating merger and the use of a utility function where the market size is 
unaffected by changes in  . 
By summing up we get: 
Proposition 6 Merged platforms invest more in quality with a larger advertisement market 
    
       . A larger advertisement market can, however, result in both lower and higher 
content prices, depending on the quality investment cost parameter,  .  
4.4 Equilibrium outcomes – duopoly vs. merger 
In this section, we compare equilibrium outcomes for the non-cooperative duopoly case and 
the cooperative merger case. We start by focusing on advertising level, before attending to 
quality levels. Finally we discuss the differences in platforms’ pricing of content. 
Merged platforms set advertising levels strictly lower than platforms engaging in duopoly 
competition    
  
 
  
 
 
  
   
  . The intuition for this is that platforms who maximize 
profits cooperatively take into account that increased advertising level reduces the other 
platform’s advertisement profits, due to a lower advertising price per consumer,  . This 
outcome, consistent with findings from Model 1, results in higher ad profits per consumer for 
merged platforms than for duopoly platforms.  
Equilibrium quality levels are given by equations       and        for the duopoly- and 
merger case, respectively. If we disregard any substitution effects between platforms by 
setting    , it becomes evident that merged platforms invests more in quality improvements 
than duopoly ones. The result stems from a higher ad margin per consumer that raises the 
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marginal benefit of demand expanding quality investments. Duopoly platforms do, however, 
have an additional incentive to invest in quality if content is somewhat related      . This 
incentive is accredited business stealing, i.e. the capturing of consumers from the rival 
platform. Platforms that invest in quality cooperatively have no incentive to engage in 
business stealing, as it does not matter for combined profits which product consumers decide 
to purchase. Figure 4 displays equilibrium quality levels for the two competition scenarios 
with the content differentiation parameter   on the horizontal axis45. 
 
The figure demonstrates that merged platforms set higher quality levels for sufficiently 
undifferentiated content, a general result proven in appendix B1. The illustration also shows 
that quality investments amongst duopoly platforms will exceed that of merged firms if 
content is sufficiently substitutable. This is, however, not a general result.  
We once again discern the content price into three distinct elements in order to compare them 
separately. The market power factor for a duopoly platform equals that of merged platforms 
when    . Recalling an increasing duopoly price in   if   
 
 
 yields the result that duopoly 
platforms will weakly price their content more above marginal cost than merged ones, 
disregarding the advertising market. Merged platforms will in the case of   
 
 
  have a 
weakly larger pricing factor.  
The cost factor is, in absolute value, increasing in   for duopoly platforms, thus reaching its 
minimum at    . At this point the cost factor is equal in the two competition scenarios.  
                                                          
45
 Chosen parameter values are      ,    ,     and      . 
 
  
Figure 4 – Equilibrium Quality Levels 
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Recall that we were unable to infer the sign of the cost factor unless we made assumptions on 
the parameter   . If the sign is positive    
 
 
 , duopoly platforms will price its content, due 
to marginal production costs of content, weakly above ones that have merged. On the other 
hand, if the sign is negative    
 
 
 , the result will be the opposite, with a lower, or equal, 
content price effect in duopoly. In the special case of   
 
 
, neither duopoly- nor merged 
platforms take marginal production costs into account in their pricing of content. 
The last element to consider is the underpricing effect. There are two distinct factors to reflect 
on in the difference of underpricing between duopoly- and merged platforms. The first factor 
is that the effect is increasing, in absolute value, in the parameter   for duopoly platforms. 
Merged platforms do, because of monopoly power in the advertisement market, have higher 
ad profits per consumer, and this is the second factor. This factor results in higher incentives 
to expand demand, which can be achieved by lowering content prices, increasing quality 
investments, or a combination of the two. Furthermore, these practices will lead to a higher 
underpricing effect in absolute value. The effect is equal for the two equilibrium scenarios if 
         
       
     
. Merged platforms will, because of ad market, price their content lower 
than duopoly platforms if the sign of the underpricing effect is negative    
 
 
  and   
      , or if the effect is positive    
 
 
  and         .  Correspondingly, a merged 
platform price its content higher than duopoly ones if   
 
 
 and         , or if   
 
 
 and 
        . 
It is not possible to infer in which direction each of the three elements impact the content 
pricing level in equilibrium without making assumptions on the parameter  . Figure 1 
captures two distinct content pricing scenarios. In scenario 1 content prices of duopoly 
platforms will exceed that of merged platforms only if   is sufficiently high. The opposite is 
true for scenario 2 where content prices in duopoly are higher only if   is sufficiently low46. 
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4.5 Welfare 
In this section we focus on society’s welfare level in equilibrium. While equilibrium 
outcomes differ slightly when introducing endogenous quality investments, economic welfare 
is defined correspondingly to Model 1. In particular, equal weights are ascribed to consumer- 
and producer surplus. Advertising is assumed to work in an informative manner with 
accompanying advertising surplus added to aggregate welfare. We first examine the three 
welfare elements separately; consumer surplus, advertising surplus and platform profits, 
before combining them to evaluate the model’s aggregate welfare level.  
It is important to emphasize that interior equilibrium content prices are employed when 
calculating welfare measures. Parameters are, consequently, assumed to be such that 
platforms will never find it optimal to set negative content prices. 
4.5.1 Consumer surplus 
Consumer demand in equilibrium is found by solving equation      , subject to equilibrium 
content prices and quality levels for the two different scenarios duopoly competition and 
merged platforms. This yields the following equilibrium consumption per platform: 
                                         
  
      
              
     
  
  
                                                
 
  
Figure 5 – Equilibrium Pricing Levels of Content (Scenario 1:  <
1
2
, Scenario 2:  >
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A higher   will, for both scenarios, reduce equilibrium consumption level, whereas a higher 
content substitutability will increase consumption in duopoly. Expressions for consumer 
surplus in equilibrium are found by inserting equilibrium consumption, content prices and 
quality levels into equation      . 
                                   
    
      
              
 
 
     
  
  
 
 
                                       
                                                 
    
 
    
 
 
     
  
  
 
 
                                                     
Consumers benefit, in both scenarios, from a lower quality investment cost
47
. They also 
benefit from increased competition between duopoly platforms
48
. This demonstrates that the 
increased quality effect dominates the adverse content pricing effect that exists when   
 
 
.  
In appendix B2 we prove that a merger between duopoly platforms will benefit consumers if 
products are sufficiently differentiated and the market is two-sided. The result, which is given 
absent efficiency gains, underlines our previous findings - in particular that conventional 
economic theory can be unsuitable in analyzing welfare effects of horizontal mergers in two-
sided markets. If the market in question is one-sided a merger can no longer benefit 
consumers. This is in line with traditional literature on horizontal mergers. 
4.5.2 Advertising surplus 
Equilibrium unit advertising price per consumer is found by solving equation       with 
respect to equilibrium advertising levels, given by equations       and       . The 
advertising price is strictly higher for the platform merger case    
  
 
 
  than for duopoly 
competition    
  
 
 
 . Advertising surplus is calculated in line with Model 1, i.e. by 
subtracting the advertising price from the advertiser’s willingness to pay for the ad, before 
summing across all ads and adjusting for equilibrium consumption level.  
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As in Model 1, we are not able to infer that a horizontal merger between platforms is welfare 
detrimental for advertisers. This is easily observed from the above equations if parameters are 
such that the second factor of    
  is close to zero and the ad market is existent      .  
Advertisers profit from a merger if the higher advertisement price increases consumption, 
either through lower content prices or higher quality levels, sufficiently to outweigh the 
adverse pricing effect. 
4.5.3 Producer surplus 
Producer surplus is found by combing equilibrium profits for the two media platforms. 
Solving equation      , subject to equilibrium conditions, yields profits per platform under 
duopoly competition. We employ the combined profit expression in       when calculating 
producer surplus for the merger case. 
                       
     
  
                     
                
      
  
  
 
 
                            
                                             
    
  
 
    
     
  
  
 
 
                                                  
First, we can infer that platforms in both scenarios make positive profits, and they will thus 
never have an economic incentive to exit the market. While this property is easily identified 
for the merger case, the proof concerning    
  is left to appendix B3. We can also infer that 
duopoly profits are falling in the competitive pressure of the content market, thus reaching 
their maximum if products are completely differentiated from consumers’ perspective49. From 
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this it can be verified that producer surplus for the merger case strictly exceeds profits under 
duopoly competition if the market is two-sided. The proof is given in appendix B4.  
While it can be easily verified that merged platforms always will suffer from a higher quality 
investment cost, the same cannot be concluded for duopoly platforms. The intuition is that 
media platforms in duopoly have an incentive to “overinvest” in quality in order to capture 
consumers from the rival firm. This business stealing effect, which is particularly large for 
undifferentiated content, can be regarded as a prisoner’s dilemma for platforms, with an 
equilibrium outcome of declined profits. The effect increases as   becomes smaller, and the 
profit losses accredited increased business stealing will, for given conditions, dominate 
investment cost savings
50
.  
4.5.4 Aggregate welfare level 
Aggregate welfare is found by accumulating surplus conditions for all market participants: 
consumers, advertisers and platforms             . Equilibrium welfare conditions 
under the two scenarios are given by 
    
  
           
  
   
                
                       
  
  
                  
   
  
           
                   
  
      
  
   
       
            
  
  
        
  
  
                           
From equations        and        we can infer some central properties concerning the 
aggregate welfare level. A larger advertisement market or a reduction in marginal production 
costs will, under both scenarios, yield a positive shift in welfare level. Welfare level in 
duopoly is, consistent with findings from Model 1, increasing in the substitutability parameter 
 51. An increase in the investment cost parameter   will be welfare detrimental for both 
duopoly competition and the merger case. The former shows that potential benefits in 
platform profits from a lower business stealing effect will be more than outweighed by the 
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losses encountered by consumers and advertisers. While the proof of    
       is given 
in the footnote, proving    
       is left to appendix B552. Figure 6 illustrates a situation 
where a merger is welfare enhancing for low levels of  , whereas high levels of   renders it 
welfare detrimental
53
. 
 
Figure 6 is, together with the abovementioned welfare properties, consistent with previous 
finding under Model 1. We are able to conclude that different market structures can benefit 
society as a whole by making assumptions on parameter values. The welfare conclusions 
derived under model 1 are thereby not altered when allowing for platforms to invest in quality 
improvements of content. Furthermore, a merger can only be welfare beneficial if the market 
is two-sided, and the proof of this is given in appendix B6. While it is, due to the complexity 
of the welfare conditions, difficult to solve explicitly for when a merger is welfare enhancing 
we have, in appendix B7, solved for the special case of undifferentiated content.  
From this we have: 
Proposition 7 A horizontal merger between platforms choosing quality levels, in addition to 
content prices and ad levels, can be welfare enhancing if the market is two-sided.  
The key trait of this particular model is that it stresses the importance of considering decision 
variables other than prices. A horizontal merger in a two-sided media market can, in some 
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Figure 6 – Aggregate Welfare Level  
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cases, be welfare beneficial even if it results in higher equilibrium content- and advertising 
prices. The intuition is that merged platforms will utilize increased ad revenues by 
intensifying quality investments. This results in increased consumption, which is rewarding to 
all market participants. Higher content prices will merely constitute a side-effect of increased 
willingness to pay for higher-quality products.  
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5. EXTENSIONS 
In this section, we discuss possible limitations of our model and provide suggestions for how 
the analysis might be enriched and extended in future research. Several assumptions underlie 
our model, and although making precise predictions of model alterations can be challenging, 
we will attempt to make conjectures about how relaxing key assumptions might impact our 
results. Although our model was never meant to capture all aspects of today’s enormously 
complex media markets, we nevertheless provide an intuition for how our model can best be 
understood in the context of recent media market developments. 
Keep in mind that our model is a simple one, designed to illustrate the important realization 
that conventional anti-trust rationale might not apply to mergers in two-sided markets. We 
have shown, through a theoretical model, how a merger – even in the absence of efficiency 
gains – can be welfare enhancing for society as a whole. This is an important result, directly 
accredited to the two-sided nature of the media industry, underlining that care should be taken 
by anti-trust authorities when assessing these markets. 
Following our theoretical predictions, we would expect a merged media firm to utilize its 
increased market power by setting a lower level of advertising. The intuition is that a 
monopolist will internalize the effect a higher advertising level has on advertising prices and 
profits of the other platform. The merged media firms’ monopoly power in the advertising 
market translates into higher ad prices. In accordance with results from Godes et al. (2009), 
we find that ad bundling is higher under duopoly than under monopoly, and that the margin 
which can be made of ads therefore is unequivocally higher in monopoly. This is a key 
mechanism in our model, giving rise to the result that it might be optimal for the merged 
platform to reduce content prices, and potentially invest more in quality, relative to firms 
competing in a duopoly fashion, in order to expand demand and bring more consumers on 
board. It is this effect that enables a merger to be welfare beneficial. 
We emphasize that this result is conditioned on there being no alternative channels for 
advertisers and no other competing media firms in the model. Two obvious extensions to our 
model then, would be to account for competition for advertising also from other media types 
and to accommodate multiple firms. A third possible extension would be to introduce a 
nuisance parameter. Before discussing each of these extensions in detail, however, we first 
reflect on how our model best fits with casual observations from today’s media markets.  
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One of the more pronounced developments in media markets over the last decade has been the 
emergence of a wide range of new media types, such as smart phones, an enormous amount of 
internet-based solutions – and more recently, the iPad – challenging the traditional media 
platforms of newspapers, radio-, and television broadcasts. Although most media users today 
utilize more than one media platform, and media use overall is ever-increasing
54
, it is a wide-
spread opinion that media firms in general face tougher competition for users and advertisers. 
A media firm, such as a newspaper, today faces competition for the attention of consumers 
from other media types while also competing for the marketing budgets of advertisers who 
typically spread their budgets across different media types. Advertisers today have an array of 
alternative advertising channels to choose from, which should intuitively increase their 
bargaining power when dealing with media platforms. 
In light of this realization, one can best think of our model as depicting a merger between two 
media firms within a particular media segment. Regional newspapers or magazines could be 
such an example. There are conceivably few substitutes for advertising in local newspapers as 
they often contain unique content, attracting a correspondingly unique subscribing group of 
consumers. As advertisers in local newspapers and magazines have few – if any – alternate 
advertising channels, the prediction that the merged media firm can enjoy monopoly power in 
advertising might not be too far off. Recall also that we assumed advertisers to regard 
consumers as a homogenous mass, meaning they are not interested in targeted advertising and 
only care about the relative prices of advertising in the different media outlets. Moreover, by 
deploying the framework of the representative consumer, we assumed all consumers to have 
identical preferences. Again, this fits well when applied to the segment level. Within a 
particular segment, consumers are likely to be very similar and there is little scope for 
targeted advertising. A local grocery store, for instance, is not likely to care about the segment 
levels amongst readers of the local newspaper it advertises in, and it has, presumably, few 
alternate channels for reaching consumers. In this setting, the mechanisms of our model could 
very much be in play, and the corresponding welfare implications would therefore persist. 
5.1 Across-media competition for advertising 
In reality however, media firms will often compete for advertising with firms belonging to 
other media industries. Recall that this was the novelty of Godes et al. (2009). By accounting 
for across media competition for advertising, we would expect the scope for raising 
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advertising revenue to be restricted. Even though a media firm has monopoly power in selling 
content to consumers, the firm will, in many instances, have its market power in advertising 
restricted if there are substitutes available to advertisers. In the context of our model, this 
means that the welfare effects we find are likely to be somewhat mitigated as the monopolist 
will not be able to increase his advertising revenues to the same extent as when he faces no 
competition for advertising. 
It is not given, however, that advertisers always see different media types as substitutes. 
Recall that Godes et al. (2009) raised the possibility that different media types might also be 
considered complements by advertisers, i.e. that the benefit of spreading advertising across 
different media types is greater than if all ads were run on the same media platform. This 
seems reasonable in certain scenarios. Most media users today divide their time between 
different media types and there might be a reinforcing effect of running ads on several 
platforms
55
. Think back to the case of a monopolist facing competition for advertising from 
two firms belonging to a different media industry. If it indeed is the case that advertising in 
different media types are complements, Godes et al. (2009) find that the monopolist will 
bundle more ads and enjoy higher profits than the two competing media firms in the other 
media. They also find that lower content prices will be set by the monopolist if advertising 
complementarity is high. This is because the presence of a second media now works to 
increase the margin which can be made of ads, further encouraging underpricing of content to 
generate demand on the consumer side. As all parties – media platforms, advertisers and 
consumers – will benefit, we can only surmise that a merger in this scenario will strengthen 
the welfare results from our model. 
5.2 Multiple firms 
In our paper, we restricted the number of firms to two. When analyzing a merger in a less 
concentrated media market, where there is more than one independent firm left in the industry 
post-merger, matters are more complicated as the merged media firm will also compete with 
other firms from its own media market. Typically, how much advertising will be bundled, and 
how much advertising revenue can be raised, will in this scenario depend also on the media 
firm’s substitutability with other firms in the same market. This was covered extensively in 
Kind et al. (2009a). In our model, we would expect an increase in the number of firms to have 
a similar effect as the introduction of advertising substitutes. There will be tougher 
                                                          
55
 Chang and Thorson (2004) discuss synergies between internet- and television advertising. 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
77 
 
competition for advertising and the merged media firm will therefore not be able to increase 
the margin on the sale of ads to the same extent as before. While a merger could still be 
welfare enhancing, effects on welfare are likely to be less pronounced. 
5.3 The nuisance effect of advertising 
In this paper, we chose to disregard the nuisance parameter mainly in order to simplify 
algebra. We argued, however, that empirical estimates of the nuisance effect of advertising 
vary greatly amongst different media markets. While demand is often found to be independent 
of ads in the newspaper market, most empirical estimates of the effect of advertising in 
television- and radio broadcasts show that consumers generally dislike advertising. While 
these matters have been covered extensively throughout this paper, we have not yet discussed 
how the omission of the nuisance parameter in our model might impact results. 
In the event that consumers dislike ads, an increase in one firm’s ad level will affect the rival 
firm in two ways. First, just as when there is no nuisance effect, by increasing the amount of 
advertising, the price of advertising goes down. In addition, however, there is now a second 
and indirect effect of raising the ad level; because consumers dislike advertising, the media 
firm that has more ads becomes less attractive – leading some consumers to shift to the other 
media firm. The indirect effect will therefore lead to increased demand for the other product, a 
positive externality that a monopolist will take into account. This indicates that the presence 
of a nuisance effect leads to merged platforms setting higher ad levels. From this we can see 
that the consumer surplus will be reduced, as the level of advertising increases, whereas 
advertisers naturally profit from a higher ad level. The overall impact of the merger on 
welfare, however, is ambiguous. 
5.4 A final word on the value of media diversity 
Finally, we point to one important consideration in a merger assessment, which is unique to 
media markets. As we deployed a model in the mold of the representative consumer, we could 
not analyze how a merger might affect media diversity. The media play an integral role in any 
democracy as they are pivotal in providing decision-makers and citizens with unbiased, 
undistorted information. They are important opinion providers and ensure that the public 
debate is not limited or dominated by one powerful group. The variety of media is therefore in 
itself of great value to society. In relation to the merger between Schibsted and Media Norge, 
concerns were raised that local journalism would be threatened, that content would become 
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more similar, and that there would be an increased focus on revenue generating. While these 
concerns may very well be warranted, more research is needed in investigating how mergers 
in media markets affect how media firms choose to differentiate content. 
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6. EMPIRICS 
In this section, we seek to relate our findings to empirical work and recent observations from 
media markets. As we in this paper analyze the somewhat special case where two duopoly 
firms merge to form a monopoly, we cannot easily compare our results to specific anti-trust 
cases and empirical observations. We have not been able to identify a case analogous to the 
one we discuss in this paper, but we also find that little data is available from merger cases in 
two-sided markets in general. As reiterated throughout this paper, research on mergers in two-
sided markets – of both a theoretical and an empirical nature – is very scarce, and most 
competition authorities have only recently started to take note. One notable exemption is a 
working paper by Filistrucchi et al. (2010) which attempts to build a model of merger 
simulation applied to the Dutch newspaper market. This article will be helpful when we in the 
following reflect on some of the key characteristics of our model and how they might extend 
to the more typical merger case. 
In this working paper, the authors build a structural econometric model of merger effects on 
content- and advertising prices
56
. The framework is then applied to simulate a hypothetical 
merger in the Dutch market for newspapers, from which they data for the period 1999-2009. 
The data set at their disposal is quite unique as a big merger was effectuated in September 
2005 – involving 7 regional newspapers – allowing them to study the change in prices pre- 
and post-merger. Descriptive statistics from the Dutch newspaper market reveal that total 
amount spent on advertising in daily newspapers actually increased over the study period – an 
observation reflective of two important features of the advertising market. While several 
studies have shown that newspapers account for a declining share of the market for 
advertising, the overall growth of advertising has more than compensated newspapers for the 
loss associated with some advertisers shifting their focus to other media types
57
. 
Filistrucchi et al. (2010) allow advertising demand to depend on reader characteristics, such as 
gender, age and region. Related to previous discussion of the possible nuisance effect of 
advertising, it is interesting to observe that advertising is found to have no effect on consumer 
demand. This is in line with most previous estimates of the newspaper market. They also find 
advertising demand to depend negatively on ad price, and positively on circulation, which fits 
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nicely with our model. From total advertisement spending and the total number of column 
millimeters, the authors obtain the average advertising price per column millimeter. They note 
that although this is standard procedure, two notable shortcomings come with this way of 
computing advertising prices. First, as total advertising spending is based on list prices from 
Nielsen, any discounts which certain advertisers presumably obtain are abstracted from. 
Second, in general, the actual price paid does not equal the average price. Average advertising 
prices are deflated by the consumer index and given in 1999 Euros from the third quarter. The 
following graph shows the development in weighted average price per column millimeter for 
the merging parties, where weights are proportional to circulation. The merger is marked by 
the vertical line. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
As is clearly evident from the above graph, there was a distinct hike in advertising rates in the 
immediate aftermath of the merger. Advertising quantities do not behave in the manner 
predicted as they were expected to decline. Judging from the graph, however, advertising 
levels appear to fluctuate around the same level as before while advertising prices remain at a 
higher level in the years after the merger was effectuated. Following predictions from our 
model, we can surmise that the higher price level of advertising after the merger is due to the 
merging newspapers strengthening their bargaining position towards advertisers. This gives 
an indication that our model predictions are present also in the more typical merger scenario 
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where there are multiple independent firms left in the industry post-merger. We have not been 
able to identify similar papers addressing mergers in other types of media markets – such as 
television- and radio markets. Studies related to these markets could provide key insights into 
the effect of the nuisance of advertising as this will not be a factor in the newspaper market. 
We also noted that Filistruchi et al. (2010) build a structural model which they deploy to 
simulate a hypothetical merger involving 6 of a total of 20 newspapers. In addition to 
estimating the pricing effects on advertising and content sales, they also derive overall welfare 
pre- and post-merger. Their results show that, in this particular case, the merged newspapers 
do not raise content prices as much as they would have if the market was one-sided. This is in 
line with our model predictions. Furthermore, welfare effects are found to be smaller because 
of the two-sided nature of the market.  
Filistrucchi et al. (2010) emphasize that results may suffer from a number of limitations and 
should not be taken at face value. In particular, data do not contain newspaper characteristics 
while demand specifications are found to be insufficiently flexible. They control for fixed 
effects, but are not able to detect whether characteristics change over time. This is an 
important aspect when comparing their findings to ours. Recall from our model that welfare 
can increase even with higher content prices if the merger is accompanied by higher quality 
investments compensating consumers for lost utility due to the price increase. A change in 
quality is difficult to capture in an econometric model as developed in this paper, and as such, 
will not be accounted for in their calculations of welfare. Filistrucchi et al. (2010) is 
nevertheless an interesting paper as they develop a structural econometric model meant to 
evaluate mergers in two-sided markets. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether classic anti-trust rationale with 
regard to mergers extends to the case of two-sided markets, or whether a merger assessment 
can – due to the unique nature of such markets – produce results at odds with existing merger 
theory. We believe this to be a warranted question as it is evident from recent research that 
two-sided markets, as exemplified by media markets, function in ways not easily reconcilable 
with common economic intuition. We argue that it is essential for competition authorities to 
understand the special characteristics of these markets as a failure to do so could lead to 
policies that decrease society welfare. 
Media firms rely on income from two very different, but inextricably linked, customer groups: 
consumers and advertisers. As a result, their strategic decisions are far more complex than 
those of firms operating in conventional single-sided industries. More specifically, because 
media firms can earn an additional margin of their consumers by selling their attention to 
advertisers, they have an incentive to underprice content in order to stimulate demand. We 
suspect that such considerations can play a key part in merger assessments involving two-
sided media firms. 
To address this issue, we develop two theoretical models encapsulating media markets. These 
models account explicitly for these markets’ two-sided nature, allowing us to evaluate the 
pricing- and welfare implications of mergers between firms initially competing in a duopoly 
fashion. In order to focus solely on the pure market power effect of the merger, we abstract 
from the existence of efficiency gains. In accordance with traditional merger theory, such a 
merger scenario should inevitably be detrimental to prices and overall welfare. In the first of 
our two models, we keep the quality level fixed. Media firms can thereby only stimulate 
demand by lowering content prices. In the second model, we endogenize quality investments, 
allowing media firms to boost demand also by increasing the inherent quality of their product.  
It turns out that merged media firms could find it optimal to set lower content prices than if 
the two were competing in a classic duopoly setting. This seemingly counterintuitive result 
arises because the two media firms can, by coordinating their efforts, obtain monopoly power 
in the advertising market which they leverage to generate higher supplementary revenues per 
consumer. The additional revenue increases a platform’s incentive to stimulate demand, 
which can be achieved by lowering content prices. Our analysis is corroborating recent 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
83 
 
findings from Godes et al. (2009) and Leonello (2010) who also find that prices could be 
lower with increased concentration. 
In addition, we perform an explicit welfare analysis of the merger effects. Our findings show 
that welfare could indeed increase following a merger, a result not in line with conventional 
merger theory. Reduced content prices lead to higher consumer surplus, while increased 
consumption benefits advertisers as they reach a bigger audience with each advertisement. 
This illustrates that a competition-eliminating merger can in fact be beneficial for all market 
participants, not only the merging parties. We emphasize that this result is given absent 
efficiency gains, and that potential welfare gains arise specifically due to the two-sided nature 
of media markets. If there was no market for advertising, and the media market was a regular 
single-sided one, traditional merger analysis would apply, also to our model.  
Finally, we show how a merger can be welfare enhancing, even with higher prices on the 
consumer side. This result is accredited quality investments, which we find can be higher 
following a merger. If incentives to invest in quality are higher for the monopolist, consumers 
can be compensated for the lost utility due to higher prices. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A refers to Model 1 (exogenous quality), while appendix B refers to Model 2 
(endogenous quality).  
A1) Proof that duopoly prices are falling in  ,    
      : 
Differentiating equation       with respect to   gives 
   
  
 
  
       
     
  
  
  
where the first term is negative. To confirm that the second term is positive we have to 
impose further restrictions on the parameter values of  ,   and  . This can be done by 
regarding equilibrium consumption level   
 . Recall that consumption was constricted to be 
strictly positive.    
  is found by inserting equation       into equation      . 
  
  
   
       
     
  
  
  
The first term is positive, which implies that consumer demand is strictly positive only if the 
second term is strictly positive. From this it follows that the second term in    
     is 
positive, Q.E.D.  
A2) Proof that content prices set by merged platforms in a two-sided market are strictly lower 
than for the duopoly case if products are sufficiently differentiated,   
    
  if        
            :  
Consider the minimum case of      where products are entirely unrelated in content      . 
The difference in content prices   
    
  is then given by 
  
    
        
  
    
 
which is, conditioned on the existence of the ad market, strictly negative, Q.E.D.  
A3) Proof that we cannot infer that duopoly prices are lower than that of merged prices if 
content is sufficiently substitutable: 
To ensure non-negative consumption we impose that 
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Content prices for duopoly platforms reach their minimum when products are perfect 
substitutes      . In this case the difference in content prices   
    
  is given by 
  
    
       
 
 
     
   
   
  
If parameter values   and   are such that  
       
  
 
 
  
 
      
the minimum content prices for duopoly platforms will be strictly greater than that for merged 
platforms. The conditioned can only be satisfied if    .  
A4) Proof that platform profits are strictly higher under a merger than duopoly,    
     
 : 
Producer surplus in duopoly is decreasing in   and therefore reach a maximum at    . In 
this case the difference in producer surplus is given by  
   
     
       
  
    
 
which is strictly positive if the market is two-sided        , Q.E.D.   
A5) Conditions for unrelated content where the level of wealth is greater with merged 
platforms,  
    
      : 
  
    
       
  
   
 
   
    
      
  
  
   
Both factors inside the outer parenthesis are non-negative.  
  exceeds  
       if 
       
  
 
 
   
  
      
The condition is satisfied for a sufficiently small advertising market and    .   
A6) Proof that a merger cannot improve welfare if the market is one-sided,   
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Welfare levels are, under the condition of a non-existing advertisement market, given by 
  
       
           
        
       
  
       
 
 
       
  
  is increasing in  , and thus reaches its minimum in    . At its minimum the welfare 
level in duopoly equals  
  
         
 
 
         
       
Welfare level under duopoly competition is therefore always greater than, or equal to, welfare 
level with merged platforms, if the media market is one-sided, Q.E.D.  
B1) Proof that content quality set by merged platforms in a two-sided market strictly exceeds 
that of duopoly platforms if products are sufficiently differentiated,   
    
  if        
            :  
Consider the minimum quality case of      where products are completely unrelated      . 
The difference in quality levels   
    
  is then given by 
  
    
       
  
         
 
which is, conditioned on the existence of the ad market, strictly positive, Q.E.D.  
B2) Proof that consumers benefit from a merger in a two-sided market if content is 
sufficiently differentiated,    
     
  if                    :  
Consider the case of unrelated content where consumer surplus in duopoly reaches its 
minimum. In this case, the difference in consumer surplus prices    
     
  is given by 
   
     
       
  
   
 
 
    
 
 
 
which is, conditioned on the existence of the ad market, strictly positive, Q.E.D.  
B3) Proof that producer surplus in duopoly is strictly positive,    
   :  
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Producer surplus in equilibrium is given by 
   
  
                     
                
      
  
  
 
 
 
where the last component and the denominator of the first factor is strictly positive. The first 
two elements of the numerator of the first factor,       , are also strictly positive. The 
requirement for strictly positive profits then becomes, 
                     
     
      
       
  
This condition is satisfied through assumptions made to fulfill all second-order conditions for 
profit maximization.  
B4) Proof that producer surplus is strictly higher under a merger than duopoly competition, 
   
     
 : 
Producer surplus in duopoly is decreasing in   and therefore reaches its maximum at    . In 
this case the difference in profits between a merged platform and a duopoly one is given by 
   
     
       
 
    
      
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
   
 
Which is, conditioned on the existence of the ad market, strictly positive, Q.E.D.   
B5) Proof that welfare level in duopoly is decreasing in quality investment costs,    
     
 : 
Differentiating equation        with respect to   yields 
   
 
  
 
            
  
   
                 
                      
  
  
 
                 
   
  
  
    
     is strictly negative if  
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By recalling assumptions earlier made on   we are able to infer that the preceding restriction 
for   is in fact satisfied.  
        
  
   
      
 
   
       
                  
B6) Proof that a merger cannot improve welfare if the market is one-sided,   
       
  
        
Equilibrium welfare levels are, under the condition of a non-existing advertisement market, 
given by 
  
       
                      
                
      
  
  
       
       
       
       
  
  is increasing in  , and thus reaches its minimum in    . At its minimum the welfare 
level in duopoly equals  
  
         
       
       
         
       
Welfare level under duopoly competition is therefore weakly greater than welfare level for the 
merger case if the market is one-sided, Q.E.D.  
B7) Conditions for unrelated content where the level of wealth is greater with merged 
platforms,  
    
      : 
  
    
       
 
       
      
  
  
             
  
  
        
  
  
 
      
  
  
             
  
  
        
   
  
   
The expression will, under the following condition, be strictly positive: 
 
 
   
 
  
 
    
  
   
    
    
    
  
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
89 
 
References 
Anderson, S.P. and S. Coate (2005): “Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare 
Analysis”, Review of Economic Studies 72(4), 947-972. 
Anderson, S.P. and J.J. Gabszewicz (2005): “The Media and Advertising: A Tale of Two-
Sided Markets", Core Discussion Paper 2005/88. 
Anderson, S.P. and J. McLaren (2010, March): “Media Mergers and Media Bias with 
Rational Consumers”, University of Virginia, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7768.  
Argentesi, E. and L. Filistrucchi (2007): “Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market: 
The Case of Newspapers”, The Journal of Applied Econometrics 22(7), 1247-1266. 
d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J.J, Jaskold, J. and J.F. Thisse (1979): “On Hotelling’s 
Stability in Competition”, Econometric Society 47(5), 1145-1150. 
Bellamy, R.V. and J.R. Walker (1996): Television and the Remote Control: Grazing on a Vast 
Wasteland. The Guilford Press. 
Bergman, M.A, Coate, M.B., Jakobsson, M. and S.W. Ulrick (2010): “Comparing Merger 
Policies: The European Union vs. the United States”, Review of Industrial Organization 
36(1), 305-331. 
Butters, G. (1977): “Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices”, Review of 
Economic Studies 44(1), 465-491. 
Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2001): “Competing Cybermediaries”, European Economic 
Review 45(4-6), 797-808. 
Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2003): “Chicken and Eggs: Competition among Intermediation 
Service Providers”, RAND Journal of Economics 34(2), 309-328. 
Chandra, A. and A. Collard-Wexler (2009): “Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application 
to the Canadian Newspaper Industry”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 18(1), 
1045-1070. 
Chang, Y.E. and E. Thorson (2004): “Television and Web Advertising Synergies”, Journal of 
Advertising 33(2), 75-84. 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
90 
 
Choi, J.P. (2006): “Broadcast Competition and Advertising with Free Entry: Subscription vs. 
Free-to-Air”, Information Economics and Policy 18(1), 181-196. 
Crampes, C., C. Haritchabalet and B. Jullien (2009): “Advertising, Competition and Entry in 
Media Industries”, Journal of Industrial Economics 57(1), 7-31. 
Davidson, C. and R.J. Deneckere (1986): “Long-Term Competition in Capacity, Short-Run 
Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model”, RAND Journal of Economics 17(1), 404-415. 
Dixit, A. and V. Norman (1978): “Advertising and Welfare”, Bell Journal of Economics 
9(1),1-17. 
Eckland, B. and A. Hagen (2011, May 26): “Føler Seg Frem Hos Dagbladet”, Dagens 
Næringsliv, Paper Edition, 98-100. 
Eika, H. and L. Solheimsnes (2010) “Velferdsimplikasjoner av Restrukturering i TV-
Markedet – En teoretisk Studie”, SNF Working Paper No. 22/10 
Evans, D.S. (2003): “The Anti-trust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets”, Yale 
Journal on Regulation 20(2), 325-382. 
Evans, D.S. and M.D. Noel (2008): “The Analysis of Mergers that Involve Multi-sided 
Platform Businesses”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4(3), 663-695. 
Evans, D.S. and R. Schmalensee (2007): “The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-
Sided Platforms”, Competition Policy International 3(1), 151  
Fan, Y. (2010, April 13): “Market Structure and Product Quality in the US Daily Newspaper 
Market”, Mimeographed, Yale University. 
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1990): “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis”, American 
Economic Review 80(1), 107-125. 
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (2001): “Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger 
Analysis”, Anti-trust Law Journal 68(1), 685-710. 
Filistrucchi, L., D. Geradin, S. Keunen, E. Van Damme and J. Wileur (2010, June 25): 
“Mergers in Two-Sided Markets – A Report to the NMa”, Tilburg Law and Eonomics Center, 
Tilburg University. 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
91 
 
Filistrucchi, L., T. Klein, and T. Michielsen (2010): “Merger Simulation in a Two-Sided 
Market: The Case of the Dutch Daily Newspapers”, NET Institute Working Paper #10-15. 
Gabszewicz, J.J., D. Laussel, and N. Sonnac (2001): “Press Advertising and Ascent of the 
Pensee Unique”, European Economic Review 45(1), 645-651.  
Godes, D., E. Ofek, and M. Sarvary (2009): “Content vs. Advertising: The Impact of 
Competition on Media Firm Strategy”, Marketing Science 28(1), 20-35. 
Hagen, G. (2008, February 26): “Media Norge Godkjent”, Dagens Næringsliv. Available 
from: http://dn.no/forsiden/etterBors/article1322913.ece (Accessed June 2, 2011). 
Hotelling, H. (1929): “Stability in Competition”, The Economic Journal 39(1), 41-57. 
Kaiser, U. and M. Song (2009): “Do Media Consumers Really Dislike Advertising?”, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 27(1), 292-301. 
Kaiser, U. and J. Wright (2006): “Price Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence From the 
Magazine Industry”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(1), 1-28. 
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro (1985): “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility”, 
American Economic Review 75(3), 424-440. 
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro (1986): “Technology Adaption in the Presence of Network 
Externalities”, Journal of Political Economics 94(1), 822-841. 
Kind, H.J., T. Nilssen, and L. Sørgard (2009a): “Business Models for Media Firms: Does 
Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue?”, Marketing Science 28(1), 1112-1128. 
Kind, H.J., G. Schjelderup, and F. Stähler (2009b): “Newspaper Differentiation and 
Investments in Journalism: The Role of Tax Policy”, NHH Dept. of Finance & Management 
Science Discussion Paper 2009/12. 
Kreps, D. and J. Scheinkman (1983): “Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition 
Yield Cournot Outcomes”, Bell Journal of Economics 14(2), 326-337. 
Leonello, A. (2010): “Horizontal Mergers in Two-Sided Markets”, Mimeographed, European 
University Institute.  
Motta, M. (2004): Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press. 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
92 
 
NOU 2010:14 (2010, December 16): “Lett å komme til orde, vanskelig å bli hørt – en 
moderne mediestøtte”, Kulturdepartementet. Available from: http://regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kud 
/nouer/2010/nou-2010-14.html.?id=628603 (Accessed Jun 2, 2011). 
Peitz, M. and T.M. Valletti (2008): “Content and Advertising in the Media: Pay-tv versus 
Free-to-Air”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 26(4), 949-965. 
Rochet, J.C. and J. Tirole (2002): “Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of 
Payment Card Associations”, RAND Journal of Economics 33(4), 1-22. 
Rochet, J.C. and J. Tirole (2006): “Two-Sided Markets: A Progess Report”, RAND Journal of 
Economics 37(3), 645-667. 
Salant, S., S. Switzer and R. Reynolds (1983): “Losses from Horizontal Mergers: The Effects 
of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equlibrium”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 98(1), 185-199. 
Salop, S. (1979): “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods”, Bell Journal of 
Economics 10(1), 141-156. 
Schibsted. (2011, March 10): “Merger of Media Norge and Schibsted Approved”, Available 
from: http://schibsted.com/en/Press-Room/News-archive/2011/Merger-of-Media-Norge-and-
Schibsted-Approved/ (Accessed May 15, 2011). 
Shubik, M. and R. Levitan (1980): Market Structure and Behavior. Harvard University Press. 
Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2011, March 31): “Norwegian Media Barometer 2010”, Available 
from: http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/07/02/30/medie_en/ (Accessed Jun 5, 2011) 
Tirole J. (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press. 
Tisdall, J. (2006, July 25): “Orkla Media Deal Finally Done”, Aftenposten. Available from: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/english/business/article1399195.ece (Accessed June 2, 2011). 
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010): “Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines”. 
Vadseth, H.C. (2011, January 12): “Pessimistene Tar Feil”, E24.no. Available from: 
http://e24. no/media/spaltister/pessimistene-tar-feil/3984755 (Accessed Jun 2, 2011) 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
93 
 
Vives, X. (1999): Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Wilbur, K.C. (2008): “A Two-Sided, Empirical Model of Television Advertising and Viewing 
Markets”, Marketing Science 27(3), 356-378. 
Wilkerson, D. (2005, August 9): “Clear Channel, Entercom Advance”, MarketWatch. 
Available from: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/clear-channel-entercom-advance-on-
earnings-news (Accessed May 25, 2011). 
Williamson, O.E. (1968): “Economics as an Anti-trust Defense: The Welfare Trade-offs”, 
American Economic Review 59(1), 954-959. 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11
SNF Working Paper No 24/11 
 
PUBLICATIONS WITHIN SNF’S TELE AND MEDIA ECONOMICS PROGRAM  
 
2008- 
 
Jesper Hatletveit  Mergers in two-sided media markets: Pricing and welfare 
Ole-Jakob S. Lillestøl  implications 
    SNF Working Paper No 24/11 
 
Marius Hagen   Drivkreftene bak opplagsutviklingen til en landsdekkende norsk 
Øyvind Nøstdal tabloidavis. En økonometrisk tidsserieanalyse av Verdens Gang 
fra 1978 til 2009 
 SNF Working Paper No 23/11 
 
Hans Jarle Kind  Indirekte pressestøtte: Momsfritak vs 
Jarle Møen   skattefradrag 
    SNF Working Paper No 21/11 
 
Armando J. Garcia Pires Advertising, news customization and media pluralism 
    SNF Working Paper No 54/10 
 
Armando J. Garcia Pires Media plurality, news customization and the intensity of  
    readers’ political preferences 
    SNF Working Paper No 53/10 
 
Jarle Møen   Samfunnsøkonomiske perspektiver på pressestøtten 
    SNF Working Paper No 49/10 
 
Ida Rødseth Kjosås  Konjunkturutvikling og annonseinntekter i 
Henrik Hylland Uhlving redaksjonelle medier 
    SNF Working Paper No 44/10 
 
Øystein Foros   Do advertisers or viewers decide TV channels’ 
Hans Jarle Kind  programming choice? 
Guttorm Schjelderup  SNF Working Paper No 43/10 
 
Kenneth Fjell   The economics of social networks: The winner takes 
Øystein Foros   it all? 
Frode Steen   SNF Working Paper No 42/10 
 
Stine Grønnerud Huseklepp WiMP – Styring av verdinnettverk og digitale 
Ole-Jon Norgård Lund forretningsmodeller – en casestudie 
    SNF Working Paper No 41/10 
 
Ådne Cappelen  Evaluation of the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme 
Erik Fjærli   SNF Working Paper No 36/10 
Frank Foyn 
Torbjørn Hægeland 
Jarle Møen 
Arvid Raknerud 
Marina Rybalka 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11 
 
 
Tor Jakob Klette  R&D investment responses to R&D subsidies: A theoretical  
Jarle Møen   analysis and a microeconomic study 
    SNF Working Paper No 33/10 
 
Ørjan Robstad   Optimal merverdibeskatning av mediemarkeder: En tosidig 
Øyvind Hagen  analyse 
    SNF Working Paper No 32/10 
 
Håkon Eika   Velferdsimplikasjoner av restrukturering i TV-markedet 
Linda Solheimsnes  SNF Working Paper No 22/10 
 
Simon P. Anderson  Hotelling competition with multi-purchasing: Time Magazine, 
Øystein Foros   Newsweek, or both? 
Hans Jarle Kind  SNF Working Paper No 21/10 
 
Hans Jarle Kind  Price coordination in two-sided markets: Competition in the TV 
Tore Nilssen   industry 
Lars Sørgard   SNF Working Paper No 20/10 
 
Leif B. Methlie  The drivers of services on next generation networks  
Jon Iden   SNF Report No 09/10 
 
Per E. Pedersen  An empirical study of variety and bundling effects on choice and  
Herbjørn Nysveen  Satisfaction: New telecommunication and media services 
    SNF Report No 03/10 
 
Kenneth Fjell   Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing 
Øystein Foros   Review of Industrial Organization 
Dabashis Dal   (2010) 36: 149-162 
 
Armando J. Garcia  Media Bias, News Customization and Competition 
Pires    SNF Working Paper No 14/10 
 
Armando J. Garcia  Media Bias and News Customization 
Pires    SNF Working Paper No 13/10 
 
Øystein Foros   Mergers and partial ownership 
Hans Jarle Kind  SNF Working Paper No 12/10 
Greg Shaffer 
 
Johann Roppen  Markedsfinansiering og privatisering av allmennkringkasting 
    SNF Working Paper No 11/10 
 
Peder Dalbæk Bruknapp Det norske TV-markedet – Hvorfor tilbyr distributørene  
Anne Marthe Harstad  kanalpakker, og vil sluttbrukerpris påvirkes av distributørenes  
    kostnadsendringer ved overgang til enkeltkanalvalg? 
SNF Working Paper No 42/09 
 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11 
 
Kenneth Fjell Online advertising: Pay-per-view versus pay-per-click with 
market power 
    SNF Working Paper No 32/09 
 
Jonas Andersson  A simple improvement of the IV estimator for the classical 
Jarle Møen   errors-in-variables problem 
    SNF Working Paper No 29/09 
 
Øystein Foros   Entry may increase network providers’ profit 
Hans Jarle Kind  Telecommunications Policy 33 (2009) 486-494 
Merete Fiskvik Berg  Gjeldsfinansiering av immateriell investeringer 
Marit Bjugstad  SNF Working Paper No 26/09 
 
Hans Jarle Kind  Tax responses in platform industries 
Marko Koethenbuerger SNF Working Paper No 24/09 
Guttorm Schjelderup  Oxford Economic Papers 62 (2010): 764-783 
 
Øystein Foros   Slotting Allowances and Manufacturers’ Retail 
Hans Jarle Kind  Sales Effort 
Jan Yngve Sand  Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 76(1) 266-282 
 
Jon Iden   Identifying and ranking next generation network services 
Leif B. Methlie  SNF Report No 12/09 
 
Kjetil Andersson  Network competition: Empirical evidence on mobile termination  
Bjørn Hansen   rates and profitability 
    SNF Working Paper No 09/09 
 
Martine Ryland Hvordan påvirker termineringsavgifter små mobiloperatører 
som One Call? 
    SNF Working Paper No 08/09 
 
Terje Ambjørnsen  Customer Ignorance, price cap regulation and rent-seeking in  
Øystein Foros   mobile roaming 
Ole-Chr. B. Wasenden SNF Working Paper No 05/09 
 
Hans Jarle Kind  Market shares in two-sided media industries 
Frank Stähler   SNF Working Paper No 04/09 
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
    166 (2010) 205-211 
 
Hans Jarle Kind  Should utility-reducing media advertising be taxed? 
Marko Koethenbuerger SNF Working Paper No 03/09 
Guttorm Schjelderup 
 
Morten Danielsen  Muligheter og utfordringer i fremtidens rubrikkmarked 
Magnus Frøysok  på Internett 
    SNF Working Paper No 02/09 
 
 
SNF Working Paper No 24/11 
 
Johanne R. Lerbrekk Markedssvikt i TV-markedet og behovet for offentlige kanaler 
- sett i lys av digitaliseringen av bakkenettet 
SNF Working Paper No 01/09 
 
Tore Nilssen   The Television Industry as a market of attention 
    SNF Arbeidsnotat 39/08 
    Nordicom Review 31 (2010) 1, 115-123 
 
Per E. Pedersen  The effects of variety and bundling on choice and satisfaction:  
Herbjørn Nysveen  Applications to new telecommunication and media services 
    SNF Working Paper No 33/08 
Øystein Foros The interplay between competition and co-operation: Market  
Bjørn Hansen players’ incentives to create seamless networks 
 SNF Working Paper No 22/08 
 
Per E. Pedersen An exploratory study of business model design and customer  
Leif B. Methlie value in heterogeneous network services 
Herbjørn Nysveeen SNF Report No 09/08, Bergen 
 
Hans Jarle Kind Business models for media firms: Does competition matter for 
Tore Nilssen how they raise revenue? 
Lars Sørgard SNF Working Paper No 21/08, Bergen 
 Marketing Science, Vol. 28, No. 6,  
 November-December 2009, 1112-1128 
 
Helge Godø Structural conditions for business model design in new 
Anders Henten information and communication services – A case study of 
multi-play and MVolP in Denmark and Norway 
 SNF Working Paper No 16/08, Bergen 
 
Hans Jarle Kind On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two- 
Marko Koethenbuerger sided markets 
Guttorm Schjelderup SNF Working Paper No 08/08, Bergen 
 Economics Letters, Vol. 104 (2009) 86-88 
 
Øystein Foros Price-dependent profit-shifting as a channel coordination 
Kåre P. Hagen device 
Hans Jarle Kind SNF Working Paper No 05/08, Bergen 
 Management Science, Vol. 8, August 2009, 1280-1291 
 
Hans Jarle Kind Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets 
Marko Koethenbuerger SNF Working Paper No 01/08, Bergen 
Guttorm Schjelderup Journal of Public Economics 92(2008) 1531-1539 
